The Eurasian Triangle. Russia, the Caucasus and Japan, 1904-1945

124 Ë Renewal

At any rate it is absolutely necessary for Japan to maintain good relations with Britain in the event

of conict between Japan and the Soviet Union.⁶⁵

Hashimoto then went on to discuss the “Great Armenianism” (a movement to con-

struct a Great Armenian State from Armenian territory in the Soviet Union and

Turkey), which he felt could be useful, if, and only if, Turkey turned against the Soviet

Union. As long as Turkey was on friendly terms with Moscow, Great Armenianism

was unrealistic. Although the Georgian independence movement would weaken the

Soviet Union, according to Hashimoto, it would be necessary to guarantee Georgia’s

independence internationally. For this purpose, the support of Britain would be nec-

essary. Hashimoto displayed a typical prejudice of the time: the Northern Caucasian

mountaineers were of “such low cultural development” that even though they could

be used for partisan warfare, they could not be depended on for important political

purposes. As for using White Russians in the Caucasus, it would be disadvantageous

because they would alienate the Caucasians.⁶⁶

Having reviewed the Muslim movement, Great Armenianism, the Georgian inde-

pendence movement, and the partisan activity of the mountaineers, Hashimoto con-

cluded that a possible option would be to let the Caucasus fall into chaos by pitting

these political movements against one another. The most important trigger for this sce-

nario would be Great Armenianism, which would antagonize Turkey, Georgia, Azer-

baijan, and others against Armenia and lead the Caucasus into disarray.⁶⁷

In his memorandum, Hashimoto described Georgia as culturally closer to Europe

than to Russia and as eager for independence. Therefore, Georgia, particularly its

many intellectuals within the Soviet Union, was worth exploiting for subversion in

the event of war. Hashimoto then noted that the Armenian people, by nature hard-

working, were supported by the Armenian diaspora in Turkey and the United States.

Again, typical of the racial and cultural stereotyping of the time, Hashimoto character-

ized Azerbaijan as culturally and politically less dynamic and less useful for Japan’s

strategic goals. The Caucasian “mountain peoples,” Chechens, Dagestanis, Ossetians

and others who had given the most trouble to the establishment of Soviet power in

the Caucasus, Hashimoto emphasized, were dicult to use politically because of their

ethnic diversity and their “low cultural development.”⁶⁸

65 NARA RG331, Doc. 1989, 2.
66 NARA RG331, Doc. 1989, 2.
67 NARA RG331, Doc. 1989, 2.
68 NARA RG331, Doc. 1989, 6–13. At the time, taking note of the presence in Turkey of Leon Trot-
sky, who had been expelled from the Soviet Union, and foreseeing his potential as a political ally,
Hashimoto stationed a Japanese ocial named Nemoto (a Russian speaker married to a Russian) on
Principo Island where Trotsky lived (Eitaro Tatamiya, ̄ Hashimoto Kingoro Ichidai ̄ [Tokyo: Fuyo shob ̄ o, ̄
1982], 29). In April 1929, Hashimoto recommended to a meeting of Japanese military attachés in Berlin
that they consider using Trotsky and his supporters exiled in Turkey for Japan’s intelligence. This doc-