Japan and Caucasian Émigré Forces Ë 141
(4) There are about one thousand armed forces we can dispatch to Soviet territory from Persia in
the initial phase of our plan.⁵³
(5) In the Soviet-Turkish border areas we can organize about one thousand armed forces from
Northern Caucasians living in Turkey...
(6) At the present moment, the best chance to organize illegal communication networks within
Soviet territory is by Azerbaijani groups across the Soviet-Persian borders.⁵⁴
In February 1934, before his return to Tokyo, Kanda traveled in Iraq, Syria, Palestine,
and Egypt for intelligence purposes. Kanda further wrote in his report:
Our political and subversive activity should not be limited to Europe. We should consider all kinds
of political and subversive activity against the Soviet Union using all means and from all aspects
without limiting ourselves to Europe. One of the more or less desirable plans for us in this regard
is to use Muslim states.
In order to realize this plan, we need to create positions of trade and commerce in Afghanistan,
Turkey, Persia, Arabia, Egypt and other countries. We have to dispatch suciently able ocers to
these countries under such disguise, because it is now very dicult to nd appropriate diplomats
for this work....
We need to conduct agitation among notable Muslim leaders in all these countries in order to
create stations for combined political and subversive activity against the Soviet Union...
If we follow the British example of using Arabic soldiers in Palestine during World War I, it is
realizable. The Turkic race (in Azerbaijan) is by far the best of the Muslim groups in this regard.
The Muslims are more militant than the Ukrainians. Furthermore, we have to emphasize that
Chinese Muslims are incomparably militant.⁵⁵
Grandiose though Kanda’s scheme was, it appears to have become thoroughly known
to Moscow through its intelligence operations. It is dicult to believe that the scheme
achieved any signicant success.
After World War II, Kanda wrote a memoir in which he stated that while working
in Turkey, he sought to open a communication route to Azerbaijan from Persia, but
that after a Japanese military attaché was appointed in Persia in 1933, he entrusted
this work to him.⁵⁶
53 According to Soviet sources and documents of the Promethean movement, in 1930–31 more than
ve thousand Azerbaijanis ed Soviet Azerbaijan because of the forced collectivization and repres-
sions. Some of these refuges settled in the frontier zone on the territory of Persia and conducted parti-
san warfare against Russians. See L.S. Gatagova, L.P. Kosheleva, and L.A. Rogovaia, eds.,TsK RKP(B)-
VKP(b) i natsional’nyi vopros, kn. 1 (Moscow: ROSSPEN, 2005), 670 and 673, “Obzor politicheskoi
raboty za 1932 g. organizatsii narodov, vhodiashchikh v ligu ‘Prometei’,”in Mamoulia, ed.,Kavkazskaia
Konfederatsiia, p. 34 and “Appel de Mir Yacoub (Président par interim de la délégation de la République
d’Azerbaïdjan à Paris) à Son Excellence Monsieur le Président de l’Assemblée de la Société des Na-
tions,” 10 September 1930 (Personal archive of Georges Mamoulia).
54 Kirichenko, “Kominterun to Nihon,” 108.
55 Kirichenko, “Kominterun to Nihon,” 109.
56 Masatane Kanda, “J ̄oh ̄o kinmu ni taisuru kaiso,” available at B ̄ ̄oeish ̄o Boei Kenky ̄ ̄ujo Toshokan
(hereafter BBKT), Tokyo, Japan.