The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and World War II Ë 179
was suspected of providing nancial support to Bammat and the Caucasus group to
organize sabotage in the oil operations of Baku and Grozny.³⁸As it was, the British-
French scheme had its own danger of cementing the German-Soviet alliance against
them. Nevertheless, supported by all stripes of Caucasian émigré political groups,³⁹
elaborate preparations went ahead, only to fail owing to the unexpectedly swift fall of
Paris in June 1940.⁴⁰
Although Moscow was familiar with the British-French scheme and took appropri-
ate military preparations in the Caucasus, it was as much disappointed by the French
capitulation as it gloated, for it meant that, with only Britain standing against Ger-
many in the West, Hitler’s attention now might turn to the East – to the Soviet Union.
Stalin knew that confrontation with Nazi Germany was inevitable, but he wanted to
delay it as long as possible while strengthening the Soviet Union’s ghting capacity.
Stalin was at times overcon dent that he could outsmart Hitler. Nevertheless, the fall
of France prompted the Soviet Union to expand what it considered a vital security
zone: it occupied and then incorporated into itself the three Baltic states (Estonia,
Latvia, and Lithuania) as well as Bessarabia and Northern Bukovyna (both of which
had been under Romania until then).
These events were extremely disappointing to the Caucasus group and many
other émigré groups. To them, Japan’s defeat at Khalkhin Gol, the destruction of
Poland, Hungary’s elimination of Carpatho-Ukraine, Finland’s capitulation and terri-
torial concession to the Soviet Union, the disappearance of the Baltic states, and the
forceful incorporation of Bessarabia and Northern Bukovyna into the Soviet Union –
all were bad omens. The Caucasus group thereupon dissolved and publication of its
journalKavkazceased (as did, in the wake of Paris’s fall, publication ofLa Revue de
Promethée, which had replacedPromethéein 1938).⁴¹
Even so, Bammat and his group did not abandon their ght or hope for ultimate
victory. According to a report sent by Berishvili, now working for Moscow, to Beria in
September 1940, even though for now the Soviet Union was on friendly terms with
Germany, the Caucasus group was continuing their activity and propaganda, “hop-
ing that after the defeat of Britain, Germany would start war on the Soviet Union and
38 See French counterintelligence information in “Note de l’inspecteur général de la surveillance du
territoire,” 29 September 1939, Centre d’archives contemporaines (Fontainebleau), box no. 19940501;
also, Mamoulia,Les combats indépendandistes des Caucasiens, 223.
39 See Mamoulia,Les combats indépendandistes des Caucasiens, 271; also Burds, “The Soviet War
against ‘Fifth Columnists’,” 285.
40 Britain still did not, however, completely abandon the possibilities of the operation until Hitler’s
attack against the Soviet Union in June 1941. See Günter Kahle,Das Kaukasusprojekt der Alliierten vom
Jahre 1940(Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1973).
41 Ironically, it was just before the fall of Paris that the Armenians, fearing the repetition of 1918,
abandoned the territorial issues with Turkey and decided to join the council of the Caucasian Federa-
tion (see p. 143) led by the Prometheans. See Mamoulia,Les combats indépendandistes des Caucasiens,
259, 389–90.