War Ë 15
ing the Northern Caucasian peoples, the Southern Caucasian states (today’s Georgia,
Armenia, and Azerbaijani), and Central Asia. Yet some of the territory was gained only
after bitter military struggle, as exempli ed by the Caucasian War of 1817–64. This was
an area where Russia’s hold was particularly precarious. Schemes to break up Russia
from within through “wars of nationalities” were old. During the Crimean War in the
mid-nineteenth century and beyond, Britain entertained such plans, although how
hard it pursued them is unclear.⁴It did, however, pursue similar plans in the 1880s.
In the years leading up to the Russo-Japanese War and during the war itself, Britain
considered the Caucasus crucial for its strategic purposes, that is, to maintain and
expand its in uence and control in Persia, India, and Central Asia at the expense of
Russia. For this purpose, Britain entertained the idea of organizing armed uprisings
in the Caucasus and apparently did at least supply weapons and ammunition.⁵
Japan likely learned lessons from the experience of other countries such as Britain
and Ottoman Turkey that had fought against Russia in the past. As the Russo-Japanese
competition in the Far East escalated, Japan increasingly paid attention to gathering
intelligence on Russia. The Japanese military in particular was preparing for eventual
armed con ict in great earnest. Tokyo sent many military o cers to strategic parts
of the Far East disguised as private citizens engaged in commerce, such as photog-
raphers, barbers, and brothel owners.⁶Like other countries, Japan of course used its
diplomatic posts as well. In 1902, it opened a consulate in Odesa (or Odessa),⁷in to-
day’s Ukraine, to observe, among other matters, the movement of the Russian Black
Sea eet.
Japan’s activity thus became global, re ecting the size and nature of modern con-
ict. By the turn of the century, the Caucasus had also begun attracting the attention
of Japanese strategists. Giichi Tanaka (1864–1929) was probably the rst Japanese to
recognize the importance of this area to Japan’s interests. In 1898 Captain Tanaka, a
descendant of a samurai family who would become prime minister of Japan in the late
1920s, was sent to St. Petersburg as an assistant military attaché, although his sta-
tus as such may not have been o cially acknowledged. Going there to investigate the
country, he not only learned the Russian language but also russi ed his name (Giichi
Nobusukevich Tanaka). An atheist up to that point, he converted to Orthodox Chris-
4 Figes,The Crimean War, 401, 453.
5 See I.Sh. Menteshashvili,Zakavkaz’e v anglo-russkikh protivorechiiakh v 1880–1914 gg.(Tbilisi:
[n.p.], 2001), 63–65.
6 The best-known example is Makiyo Ishimitsu who had studied in Russia and then in 1901 left his
o cial position in the army to take up a special assignment: running rst a laundry shop and then
a photography shop in Harbin and becoming the o cial cameraman of the Russian troops stationed
there and elsewhere in Manchuria. See his memoirs, Masato Ishimitsu (ed.),Ishimitsu Makiyo no shuki
(Tokyo: Ch ̄u ̄o k ̄oron, 1988).
7 Here and hereafter, the Ukrainian spelling of “Odesa” is used.