The Akashi Operations Ë 35
tion to divert rst to Kemi and Jakobstad (Pietarsaari), on the northern and central
coast of Finland, where some arms were unloaded. This was on 5 and 6 September,
by which time the Russo-Japanese War had ended. But when the boat left Jakobstad
to journey further south, it soon ran aground, well short of its eventual goal, St. Pe-
tersburg, the capital of Russia. On 6 September, unable to extract itself and in fear of
Russian authorities, the crew blew up the boat and ed.⁶¹
Some of the Swiss-made weapons were, however, recovered by Russian author-
ities. In November 1905 the concerned Russian police sent an inquiry to the Swiss
Department of Justice and the Swiss police: who had bought the 608 Swiss-made Vet-
terli Swiss ri es (and ammunition) recovered from a steamboat wrecked o the coast
of Finland in August 1905 (apparently referring to the Russian calendar still then in
force). In early January 1906, the Swiss Military Department, to which the inquiry was
forwarded, responded that they could not honor the request and that, in any case, it
was impossible to determine who had bought the weapons and ammunition. These
older weapons were being liquidated, and the bulk of them were being sold retail by
the Swiss army without regard to purchasers, most of whom were from Switzerland
and neighboring countries.⁶²
The Caucasus operation, on the other hand, though much less known, fared bet-
ter. The shipment of arms to the Caucasus was organized by Dekanozishvili. Another
Georgian, Leo Kereselidze, characterized Dekanozishvili as
the driving force behind the revolt being prepared in Georgia. He was from Ti is, a fanatical pa-
triot, a revolutionary by instinct, a humanitarian kind at heart, but ready to be ruthless regardless
of consequences, and to send his friends to death if his plans needed it.... Proud and thin-
skinned, as every Georgian, he had, however, the ability to make friends with all manner of men
and to get their help.... His voice was deceptive, for it was soft and musical, but what he said
was always clear and decided and often harsh, for though he saw visions he was not all a dreamer
but also a man of action, and his eyes were compelling and demanded obedience.⁶³Kereselidze was chosen by Dekanozishvili and the Ti is Committee of the Socialist
Federalists to take charge of the secret delivery of weapons and ammunition from
Europe to the Caucasus by way of the Black Sea. Inspired by Japan’s ght against
Russia, Dekanozishvili came to be convinced that “what the Japanese could do they
[Georgians] could all [sicalso] do.” He was “seeing visions of victory – Georgia full of
men marching to battle: Georgia free and triumphant leading all the Caucasus States:
61 Michael Futrell,Northern Underground: Episodes of Russian Revolutionary Transport and Communi-
cations through Scandinavia and Finland, 1863–1917(New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1963), ch. 4. Antti
Kujala, “March Separately – Strike Together,” 163–64; and Antti Kujala, “The Russian Revolutionary
Movement and the Finnish Opposition 1905: The John Grafton Aair and the Plans for an Uprising in
St. Petersburg.”Scandinavian Journal of Historyno. 5 (1980), 257–75.
62 Fonds Georges Dekanozichvili, CHAN, boxe 345 AP/1.
63 Armstrong,Unending Battle, 17–18.