The Akashi Operations Ë 37
Fig. 2.15.SteamshipSirius, Amsterdam, 1906.
and ammunition] cannot be received [in the Caucasus], this fact will scare the liberal
[sic] government of Russia into thinking of reform in Georgia. Frightened, it will tell
itself: ‘If the Georgians were able to send one boat, then they will be able to send yet
another. In this way they’ll continue their ght and organize uprisings. The Caucasus
will interfere with us at a di cult moment.’ For this reason, Russia will be forced to
think about our autonomy, as it does about autonomy in Poland and Finland.”⁶⁵
Kereselidze accepted the challenge Dekanozishvili presented to him. As in the
case of theJohn Grafton, Japan nanced the operation. By the time it actually took
place, however, Tokyo had prohibited Akashi from funding further operations.
Akashi’s assessment of the Caucasian situation had not been very encouraging to
begin with. He wrote: “During this time [of organizing the shipments of arms to the
Baltic and Caucasian regions], the con ict incited by the Russians between Tatars
and Armenians had begun in Baku in the Caucasus and Shusha in Georgia, and both
provinces dissolved into total disorder.”⁶⁶(Obviously, Akashi’s grasp of the situation
was not very solid: for example, the Armenian-“Tatar” (Azeri) massacres in Baku had
65 Viktor Nozadze, “gardasrul zhamta ambavni da sakmeni” [Events and deeds of the past].kavkas-
sioni(Caucasus) (Paris) 1964, no. 9, 122–123.
66 Akashi,Rakka ryusui ̄ , 52 (translation slightly modi ed).