The Akashi Operations Ë 41
from Ti is, “the weakness and impotence of the [Russian] Government were every-
day more manifest. Although the town was under martial law and the streets were
ceaselessly patrolled and no one was supposed to carry arms, hardly a man or boy
was without his revolver andkinjal, and political murders were of frequent occur-
rence.”⁸⁴The day theSiriusleft Amsterdam, general strikes erupted across Russia,
forcing the Tsar on 17 October (old style, 30 October new style) to declare signi cant
political concessions (the October Manifesto). This led to the release of many Geor-
gian revolutionaries (including Socialist Federalists and Social Democrats) from the
infamous Metekhi prison fortress in Ti is. The Tsar’s concession also led to a sharp
con ict between the Russian and Georgian populations in Georgia’s capital (as else-
where in the Caucasus and beyond). On 21 October (old style), Russian colonists and
o cials demonstrated on Ti is’s main thoroughfare in a show of patriotism and fealty
to the Tsar, holding portraits of the Tsar and singing the national anthem “God Save
the Tsar.” The local Black Hundreds (extreme Russian nationalists) also managed to
attract Russian railway workers to the demonstration. In a show of force, albeit osten-
sibly to protect the demonstration, the Russian government mobilized a large number
of dragoons, Cossacks, and soldiers. At some point, shots were red and bombs were
thrown at the demonstrators from buildings. The soldiers then red indiscriminately
at the buildings and the pedestrians on the street, resulting in approximately seventy
people killed and a hundred injured.⁸⁵
The western provinces of Georgia were cut o from Ti is by popular uprisings. On
21 October (old style), it was reported to Dekanozishvili from Georgia that “our coun-
try has been caught completely by disturbances. There is no need for agitation. Our
misfortune is that we don’t have sticks [guns].”⁸⁶A few weeks later Sakhokia wrote to
Dekanozishvili with relief that the situation had improved and that a constitutional
reform promised by the Manifesto would not be enough: the Georgians would not sur-
render until they had forced the Tsar to introduce a democratic republic.⁸⁷An expe-
rienced revolutionary, Dekanozishvili had calculated well the best time for theSirius
operation. On 11 November (old style) 1905, the Russian Black Sea Fleet revolted in
Sevastopol’. Most of the Russian troops were withdrawn from the Black Sea ports of
Batumi and Poti and sent to suppress insurrections in Kutaisi and Tbilisi. The insur-
rections disrupted telegraph and other means of communication in the Caucasus.⁸⁸
Meanwhile, Dekanozishvili and his comrades successfully misled Russian author-
ities about theSirius. For example, Russian foreign minister Vladimir N. Lamsdorf in-
84 Villari,Fire and Sword, 126–27.
85 Laskhishvili,memuarebi, 220–21.
86 From G. Laskhishvili to Dekanozishvili (21 October 1905). Fonds Georges Dekanozichvili, CHAN,
boxe 345 AP/1.
87 Sakhokia to Dekanozishvili (15 November 1905). Fonds Georges Dekanozichvili, CHAN, boxe 345
AP/1.
88 Nozadze, “gardasrul zhamta ambavni da sakmeni,” 127.