LOcATING THe ZIONIST-ARAB eNcOUNTeR • 23area of separation and distinction between Muslims and non- Muslims
in the empire. There was not, however, an immediate influx of non-
Muslims into the Ottoman army, as non- Muslims were offered a legal
escape from the military: they were permitted to pay an exemption fee,
the bedel- i askeri. as the exemption fee option was widely exercised
(indeed, it effectively replaced the repealed poll tax on non- Muslims),^27
with only rare exceptions, the change had few practical implications,
and thus the legal, military distinctions between Muslims and non-
Muslims persisted.^28 Moreover, as we shall see, when, after the Young
turk revolution of 1908, Ottoman authorities sought in greater ear-
nest to draft non- Muslims into the imperial military,^29 the men were
called on to appear at separate drafting stations on different days, ac-
cording to their religiously defined community: Christian young men to
gather in this location on tuesday, draft- age Jews to assemble in that
building the following thursday, and so on. In other words, even in an
act aimed explicitly at eliminating distinction based on religious dif-
ference in the empire, that distinction could effectively be magnified.^30
Intercommunal difference was certainly on the minds of the Otto-
man governors of Jerusalem in particular during the Late Ottoman pe-
riod. Whereas Jews were generally permitted to immigrate to the Ot-
toman empire, since the first years of Jewish nationalist immigration
to Palestine in the 1880s the Ottomans attempted to limit the influx
of Jews into the Holy Land. These efforts, including legal restrictions
both on the length of Jewish visitors’ stays in Palestine (the so- called
(^27) “the traditional poll tax, or jizya,” explains Stillman, “which had symbolized the
dhimmī’s humble, subject status since the early days of Islam was now [through the Tan-
zimat] rescinded. The fiscal change was, however, cosmetic, in a sense, since the jizya
was replaced with a new levy, the bedel- i askeri . . . which exempted non- Muslims from
military service, for which they had become technically liable with the granting of civil
equality. this destigmatized tax was entirely suitable to most non- Muslims, who had no
desire to enter the army.” Stillman, The Jews of Arab Lands in Modern Times, 9. Zürcher
points out that the bedel, just like the jizya before it, “was paid collectively by Christian
and Jewish communities to tax- farmers and, later, salaried treasury officials.” For a de-
tailed analysis of the Ottoman military conscription system, see Zürcher, “the Ottoman
conscription System, 1844– 1914.”
(^28) See Lewis, Semites and Anti- Semites, 123.
(^29) On the decision to impose universal conscription, see Campos, Ottoman Brothers,
150– 53. On the persistence of the Ottoman bedel- i askeri even during the First World
War, despite its high cost (ranging from thirty to fifty gold Turkish pounds), see Penslar,
Jews and the Military, 68.
(^30) According to Hanioğlu, the Young Turk Weltanschauung, “as it developed between
1889 and 1902, was vehemently antireligious, viewing religion as the greatest obstacle
to human progress.” Despite this perspective, the Young Turks “attempted to use religion
as a device for modernization.” Hanioğlu, Preparation for a Revolution, 305– 6.