204 The Origins of the Thirty Years War and the Revolt in Bohemia, 1618
been obliged to watch and wait as Maximilian’s recruitment progressed.
His plan had been to use the Danube as a defensive line against a League
advance westwards, but as its army increased in size to twice that of his
own he prudently concentrated his forces into a fortified camp on the
Michelsberg, a substantial hill immediately outside the walls of Ulm.
Maximilian waited until his League army was up to strength and then
moved towards Ulm in early June, halting on the eastern side of the
Danube with his forces encamped between the towns of Lauingen and
Günzburg, respectively fifteen and thirty miles from the city.^1
Ansbach had an estimated 13,000 men, while Maximilian had reached
the League’s agreed total of 25,000 but was still recruiting, going on to
reach a reported 30,000 by July. According to theTheatrum Europaeum’s
account everyone was expecting a full-scale war to break out in Germany
as a result. ‘On all sides there was so much arming and preparation for
war that one could readily perceive that great bloodshed was scarcely to
be avoided....Everywhere the clang of weapons, blowing of trumpets
and beating of drums was to be heard, so that it appeared as though the
war actually taking place in Bohemia was only a rehearsal for the future
contest in deadly earnest which was about to begin.’^2 That expectation
was wrong, though, and general war only spread to Germany several
years later.
Instead what happened around Ulm in the following few weeks
demonstrated not the readiness, but the unwillingness of both sides,
Union and League, Protestant and Catholic, to fight each other. That
was not the war for which Maximilian had recruited his large army, and
nor did it hold out the prospect of personal gain for him. He had written
to his brother, the elector of Cologne, shortly before that thus far the
League had aimed solely at supporting the emperor in Bohemia, as it
truly wanted to avoid a war with the Union. Hence he had deliberately
disregarded many good opportunities for a surprise attack, as he did
not want to be the first to open hostilities.^3 Maximilian’s objective was
the suppression of the revolt in Bohemia, but in order to proceed with
that he had first to neutralise the Union army, preferably by negotiation
rather than by military means.
It is commonly assumed that Ansbach was in a hopeless position,
outnumbered two to one and with little choice but to negotiate or be
annihilated, but that is not the case. His opponents were two days march
away and had a major river crossing to contend with, so that he could
have chosen to withdraw, forcing Maximilian to move even further
away from Bohemia if he wished to follow. Moreover he had had plenty
of time to establish a strong defensive position, and experience of long