236 The Origins of the Thirty Years War and the Revolt in Bohemia, 1618
Bethlen was one of the principal reasons why the war did not come
to an end following the Bohemian collapse at the battle of the White
Mountain, because as long as he was actually or potentially in the
field he provided the encouragement of a prospective ally on a sec-
ond front to others who wished to continue fighting. The concept of a
two-pronged attack on Vienna and the Austrian heartland, with Bethlen
coming from the east through Hungary and another anti-Habsburg force
coming from the west through Bohemia or Moravia, had a long life and
was several times resurrected, starting with Thurn in 1619 and ending
with Mansfeld and Christian IV of Denmark in 1626.^14 There was a plan
for such a joint attack in 1623 after new protagonists of the Palatine
cause emerged in Germany, while Friedrich’s re-engagement of Mansfeld
in February 1621 was made in the expectation that with Bethlen remain-
ing in contention and looking to defend what he had so far gained
the Habsburg side would have to split its forces during the following
campaign.
As was his wont, Bethlen spent the winter of early 1621 both negoti-
ating and preparing to fight. Ferdinand was willing to confirm his earlier
territorial concessions, but not to agree to Bethlen’s further conditions,
particularly his retention of the Hungarian crown and the inclusion of
the defeated Bohemians in a settlement.^15 Bethlen’s latter stipulation
can be viewed charitably as loyalty to his former allies, or sceptically as
an intentionally unacceptable proposal designed only to prolong discus-
sions, but either way no agreement resulted. When fighting began again
in early May 1621 Bucquoy’s Imperialist army initially had the better of
it, recapturing Pressburg and neighbouring territory in western Hungary
(modern Slovakia), before laying siege to the fortress at Neuhäusel (Nové
Zámky), which had been held by Bethlen’s garrison since 1619. The
defences were too strong, so that when after seven weeks the advance
guard of Bethlen’s army arrived the Imperialists found themselves in the
classic trap, the besiegers besieged. To make matters worse Bucquoy him-
self was killed leading a sally, and his deputy abandoned the position in
mid-July as Bethlen’s main force approached, losing a large number of
his men and his heavy artillery before reaching a safer refuge.
The margrave of Jägerndorf, the commander of the Silesian forces,
was another who was encouraged to fight on by Bethlen’s continuing
participation in the anti-Habsburg front. Jägerndorf and his men had
held out over the winter, even after the Silesian Estates had submit-
ted to Johann Georg of Saxony, as a result of which Ferdinand placed
him under the Imperial ban. Perversely, this removed any incentive for
Jägerndorf to surrender, and he also received reinforcements from the