At the Parting of the Ways 107Duke of Mecklenburg, and to proudly initial his future correspondence
‘AHzM’ (Albrecht, Herzog zu Mecklenburg).
The expropriation of Mecklenburg’s dukes was controversial at the
time and has remained so in histories, with Wallenstein often cast
as the villain of the piece. It needs, however, to be put into context.
Ferdinand never had enough cash to pay for the crippling costs of
the war, and so he turned to property, first his own and then that
confiscated from others, which he used initially as security and later
as outright payment for his debts. Of his own lands, Lusatia went to
the elector of Saxony, first as a pledge and then in perpetuity, and
Upper Austria was pledged for some years to Maximilian of Bavaria.
The estates of the Bohemian rebels and anyone even loosely associated
with them were confiscated and sold for cash, with Wallenstein the
largest but far from the only purchaser. Frederick, the ‘winter king’,
was deprived first of the Upper Palatinate, then of his electoral title and
his heartlands on the Rhine, which were used mainly to satisfy further
debts to Maximilian. The emperor, not Wallenstein, was the originator
of these measures, which in the case of Frederick were of disputed legal-
ity in respect of the confiscations and almost certainly beyond his pow-
ers regarding the transfer of the title, while although a front of judicial
procedure was established in Bohemia the basis of the unprecedented
seizures was more despotic than legal.^3 Ferdinand was prepared from an
early stage to manipulate the strict forms of Imperial legality in order to
override property rights, and Mecklenburg fits into that pattern.
Hence it is not surprising that with the emperor’s debts mounting
ideas of expropriation emerged almost as soon as the first signs of suc-
cess in the field in 1626. The initial targets were members of the lower
aristocracy who had taken military service with Christian of Denmark,
but due to the inadequacies of the bureaucracy in distant Vienna
progress was slow.^4 Nevertheless ambitions escalated, and the possibil-
ity of confiscating the duchy of Brunswick was considered following
the death of the ‘mad Halberstädter’ in June of that year. At the time
Wallenstein warned that such a provocative action would lead to pro-
longed war, an objection which has been viewed as hypocritical in the
light of his later acquisition of Mecklenburg.^5 This overlooks the fun-
damental difference in the military situation. In mid-1626 Christian of
Denmark, Bethlen Gabor and Mansfeld were all still powerful enemies,
and the emperor could not afford to make any more; by late 1627 they
were defeated, departed or dead, and thoughts of plucking the fruits of
victory to pay for the war were more realistic.