Wallenstein. The Enigma of the Thirty Years War

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From the Fury of the Norsemen Deliver Us 165

major strategic initiative, and time instead to think about shortening
his lines of communication, consolidating his position and finding
winter quarters. Logically this suggested withdrawing at least to the
River Main, which is what Wallenstein expected him to do, but that
would have meant ending the year back where he had started it, and
effectively abandoning most of his conquests further south. Such a
prudent approach was not to Gustavus’s liking, but he could find no
clear alternative.
In the last week of September he left Bad Windsheim, but intelli-
gence was so poor that for the next two weeks Wallenstein did not even
know in which direction he had gone, still less exactly where he was.
In fact Gustavus went south, where he spent a month marching back
and forth, first through Swabia and beyond, then to the Danube and
on into Bavaria, before finally hastening back to Nuremberg in the last
week of October. During this time he undertook nothing of military
significance, and such objectives as he appears to have had were at
best of minor importance, although he doubtless collected some useful
financial contributions. If nothing else his presence denied this source
of funds to Wallenstein, who was as short as ever of money for his army,
as his many letters show.^20
For a time Wallenstein hesitated, perhaps waiting for some firmer
indication of Gustavus’s intentions to emerge. Nevertheless his own
underlying strategy was clear. Firstly, although he was alert to the
possibility of catching Gustavus for a decisive battle, it is evident
that he regarded this as principally a problem for the following year,
given the lateness of the season. Secondly he continued to view
detaching Saxony from the Swedish alliance as central to improving
the Imperialist position. Matters had escalated since the failure of his
attempted peace negotiations with Arnim, and following the latter’s
invasion of Silesia in July Wallenstein had sent Holk to make a retali-
atory raid, hoping by taking the war on to Saxon territory to persuade
Elector John George that it would be more prudent to return to his
allegiance to the emperor than to rely on Swedish help. As that had
not succeeded Wallenstein decided to occupy the whole electorate,
and on leaving Nuremberg he despatched Gallas with a large force
to commence an invasion, intending to follow himself to complete
the operation, and at the same time to solve his perennial problem of
finding winter quarters.
Wallenstein was also still anxious to add the elusive Pappenheim
to his strength. His own army was by this time becoming uncomfort-
ably small, weakened not only by casualties and the losses through

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