Decline and Fall 205who should either immediately issue the necessary order to Suys or
replace him with another suitably qualified officer, ‘who will know how
to obey our Imperial commands with more discretion’.^11
On the same day Ferdinand also replied to Wallenstein about his
officers’ advice that further moves against Bernhard or into enemy ter-
ritory to seek winter quarters were impossible at that time of year. In
a letter clearly drafted by the military advisers at court he both denied
that it was ever intended to leave the troops without proper winter
quarters and at the same time justified the order to attack the Swedes
around Regensburg. Indeed, he went on, it was still necessary to des-
patch Suys to the Inn and to send more troops from Bohemia, 3000
infantry and 1000 cavalry, to reinforce the Bavarians. Wallenstein’s
response was prompt but evasive. He had just heard from Aldringer
that he and his men had arrived back in Bavaria, while he himself was
moving regiments in Moravia closer so as to have them readily avail-
able should the enemy actually make a threatening move. As regards
the cavalry in Upper Austria, he continued, but without mentioning
Suys, it would be better to be patient until the spring, when they
would be up to strength and in sounder condition to do good service.
Surprisingly but ominously Ferdinand gave way, opening the new year
with a mild acknowledgement, and conceding that in the changing cir-
cumstances and as winter was advancing he was prepared to be guided
by Wallenstein’s opinion.^12
The reason for this change of tone was a closely kept secret, but
Bartholomäus Richel, the Bavarian vice-chancellor and representative
at the Imperial court, was nevertheless able to report it to Maximilian
on 31 December. His Imperial Majesty, he wrote, had secretly decided
to remove the duke of Friedland from his command, and was already at
work winning over and making sure of the leading officers in the army.
What to do with the duke himself was as yet undecided; to let him go
free was problematic, while to arrest him, which His Majesty himself
thought the safest and best suggestion, also had its difficulties.^13
Wallenstein’s enemies had at last convinced the more important of
his former friends, and most significantly the emperor himself, that
the generalissimo had to go. These enemies were in three groups, the
Catholic die-hards, the long-standing personal foes from Bohemia, and
the disappointed officers without senior posts on active service, including
some who Wallenstein had dismissed or pushed into retirement. Most
influential among the first group were the Jesuits Wilhelm Lamormaini,
the emperor’s confessor, and Johannes Weingartner, the court preacher,
both determined advocates of continued counter-Reformation and full