Decline and Fall 215worried him that the two propositions were incompatible, requiring
Wallenstein to both join with and to drive out the foreigners, but the
rest can only have been his inventions or the fantasies of drunken
evenings with the Bohemians. Gallas was sceptical, and it was agreed
that he should endeavour to dissuade Wallenstein from any such ideas,
which the three officers would in the meanwhile not report further.
Piccolomini returned to Pilsen, but a week later he sent a confidential
agent to Vienna to reveal this alleged plan to the emperor, as well as to
the Spanish envoy Oñate and the papal nuncio.^34
The emperor believed what he was told, as set out in Lamormaini’s
report to the head of the Jesuit order: ‘On 12 January Friedland’s secret
intrigues eventually came out into the open. He wanted to ruin the
emperor and to destroy the House of Austria, to seize the Austrian lands
for himself, and to distribute the property of those loyal to the emperor
among the participants in the conspiracy.’^35 It may seem surprising
that such a fantastic story was accepted in Vienna, but the climate of
suspicion at court was such that Wallenstein’s former friends, and even
those of an independent turn of mind, could no longer argue for a more
balanced view, while his enemies exploited the story with no concern
as to whether it was true or not. Particularly significant was the Pilsen
oath, signed on 12 January and news of which reached Vienna a few
days later, which seemed to fit in with and independently confirm
Piccolomini’s tale of imminent rebellion. Hence instead of serving as a
warning to the court not to make a move against Wallenstein the oath
convinced them that they had no alternative but to do so, and quickly.
The problem was how.
An answer was provided by Prince Gundakar Liechtenstein, brother of
Wallenstein’s old associate and rival Karl, and himself a former Imperial
councillor. Although no longer in favour at court, Liechtenstein’s
views still found a hearing, and he had considerably influenced the
peace memorandum submitted by Trauttmansdorff and his colleagues
in January 1633. In December he turned his thoughts to the subject
of Wallenstein, and his opinion reached the emperor shortly before
Piccolomini’s dire warning.^36 Although when he wrote Liechtenstein
knew neither of the supposed rebellion nor of the oath, he neverthe-
less viewed Wallenstein as disobedient, citing specifically his quartering
of the army in the hereditary lands, his failure to pursue Bernhard of
Weimar, and his orders to Suys to remain in Upper Austria, all contrary
to the emperor’s commands. This disobedience posed a threat for the
future, he claimed, as it might lead Wallenstein into various forms of
treachery and rebellion, including moves against the House of Austria