Richer Than All His Tribe 49outset the income from property does not keep up with rapid inflation
and falls in real terms. Then as now, the income yield was the start-
ing point for property valuation, and hence assessed values will have
lagged behind inflation, thus likewise falling in real terms, even before
over-supply and the need for quick sales further depressed achieved sell-
ing prices. Moreover the assessors were under pressure to produce low
valuations for partly forfeit properties, where some compensation was
to be paid out, and this will have affected assessments and expectations
for properties which were to be sold. We can assume that Wallenstein
bought well, and research suggests that his offers were commonly
below, but only a little below, the assessed values.^23 Probably his agents
used their contacts and knew what prices would be acceptable, and it
would have been in his interests to bid at that level in order to maintain
relationships for the large number of purchases he wanted to make.
That is how business is done.
Resales were an important part of Wallenstein’s strategy. Estates rarely
consisted of a single block of contiguous land but more often comprised
various parcels, some possibly quite distant from the core holding. As
in modern property dealing there were often people interested in parts
who were unwilling or unable to bid for the whole, but who would pay
a relatively higher price for what they wanted. Given that the value of
Wallenstein’s sales was well over half of his total purchases this effect in
itself would have reduced the average price of his retained land consid-
erably, particularly as, unlike the emperor, he was able to wait to get his
price. There may also have been a timing effect, with land prices rising
to catch up with inflation between purchases and resales.
Currency manipulation is unlikely to have played a part. The receipt
for the three and a half million loan to the emperor refers specifically
to Rhine gulden, a relatively sound outside currency. Wallenstein’s
own borrowing would have been denominated in this same currency,
and the bankers behind him were far too astute to settle for repay-
ment in debased Bohemian gulden. Likewise the prices of the proper-
ties he bought, although valued in Bohemian gulden, will have been
offset against his loan account with the emperor at the relevant going
exchange rate for Rhine gulden. Hence this was not a source of profit, as
both he and the emperor had borrowed sound Rhine gulden and had to
repay in the same coin. Nevertheless Wallenstein later made a voluntary
additional payment of 200,000 Rhine gulden to the emperor in recogni-
tion of their successful business relationship in property dealings and
loans. Ferdinand’s letter of February 1625 acknowledging this payment
made a brief reference to inflated coinage but contained no suggestion