72 Wallenstein
external enemy was a job for a senior general. Moreover the Imperial
war council still believed in the superiority of Spanish training and
experience, so that is where they looked for their top two officers, while
Wallenstein, recently promoted to major-general, took third place.^5
The siege of Göding rarely rates more than a mention – and often
not so much – in histories of the war. Its main interest here arises from
Wallenstein’s surviving correspondence, including twenty of his daily
letters which were carried by daring messengers to Harrach in Vienna.^6
In these he criticised the inadequate preparations for the campaign,
particularly supplies, as well as the wider failure to anticipate an attack
and gather forces earlier. He complained that advancing on Pressburg
in the hope of protecting Vienna would leave Bohemia, Moravia and
Silesia open to the enemy. From inside Göding he commented on the
precariousness of their position, particularly should the hungry soldiers
decide to save themselves by seizing the officers and surrendering to
Bethlen. Nevertheless he sent a stream of advice as to arrangements and
troop dispositions which should be made to help secure the Austrian
and Bohemian territories should Göding fall. The tone is unmistakeably
that of the rising man, not yet at the top but convinced that he could
do better than those in command, not only his immediate superiors but
the war council itself. He was undoubtedly right, as later events were to
prove, but that knowledge usually only serves to make such counsel all
the more unwelcome to its recipients. Fortunately Harrach was probably
more diplomatic in passing on Wallenstein’s opinions.
Despite the relative successes of the previous year the emperor was not
in a comfortable position at the beginning of 1624, as other potential
threats across Europe were not only emerging but threatening to merge.
Spanish resources were increasingly concentrated on their none too suc-
cessful war in the Netherlands following the end of the truce in 1621,
leaving them little scope to offer Ferdinand further help. There was also
friction between Spain and France over their respective involvements
in northern Italy, and the joint Spanish and Imperialist occupation of
the Rhine Palatinate was also a matter of concern to the French, so that
despite religious differences they were driven towards the anti-Habsburg
camp. The Dutch were inevitably at the centre of this group, and the
dispossessed Frederick had long since found refuge with them. The
Protestant monarchies of Denmark and Sweden were also nervous about
Habsburg and Catholic League successes in northern Germany, uncom-
fortably close to their Baltic preserve. James I of England, after the col-
lapse in 1623 of a long-running attempt to secure a Spanish marriage
alliance for his son Charles, was suddenly more prepared to listen to