support. Henry S. Bradsher’s cruel description of it as a party of
‘teahouse political talk’ (Bradsher, 1987: 339) perfectly encapsulat-
ed its weaknesses. An unpopular state which confronts a robust
society in defence of undeserving surrogates is unlikely to find it a
rewarding or happy experience.
The second lesson was that moral conviction and external sup-
port can act as significant force multipliers which even the military
capabilities of a superpower cannot match. A great deal of evi-
dence attests to the low morale of Soviet soldiers in Afghanistan,
the bulk of them unwilling conscripts. I recall the manifest
despondency of a company of Soviet soldiers I encountered in
Uzbekistan in 1984, almost certainly destined for deployment in
the USSR’s southern neighbour. By contrast, the morale of the
resistance was in general remarkably high, and remainedremark-
ably high even in the face of terrible losses. Scorched-earth tactics
left behind survivors who in many cases had nothing left to do
exceptstruggle against the communist regime and its backers. This
was poignantly captured in the words of a young mujahidwho
remarked: ‘I died five years ago when I left Kabul. My soul has
gone to heaven; this is just my body’ (Goodwin, 1987: 175). A
resistance movement which can obtain external support is a differ-
ent foe from one which is isolated and dependent purely upon
indigenous networks for assistance. External supporters can supply
not only armaments, ammunition, and matérielwhich would other-
wise be unavailable, but also an added sense of legitimacy to a
struggle by conveying to the resistants that their objectives are
shared with other power holders, rather than eccentric and idiosyn-
cratic. This in turn can be a significant morale booster.
In a very real sense, the Soviet–Afghan war had no winners. The
Soviet Union was corroded by its political failure, and the struggle
between the Afghan resistance and Afghan communists was remit-
ted to the battlefield. It was not even a triumph for ‘conflict reso-
lution’. The Geneva Accords simply brought the first wave of the
wars of modern Afghanistan to a conclusion. The 1990s were to
prove a decade of misery and sorrow for the Afghan people. It is
now time to examine why.
Consequences of the Soviet–Afghan War 167