Kabul in order to seize it (Rubin, 1995b: 173; Bradsher, 1999:
379). During a meeting that day, Najibullah had confronted Azimi,
Delawar, and other senior figures, who were accused of treason
(Bradsher, 1999: 379). They probably held the same view of him.
Najibullah then headed for the airport, possibly because of panic
that Azimi had assumed control of his security detail (Bradsher,
1999: 379). But he never made it. A well-placed account captures
some of the drama of what must have been a truly remarkable
event: ‘He passed through two checkpoints. But close to the air-
port, where Sevan’s UN plane was supposed to land, he encount-
ered a third checkpoint. The car was stopped, and Najibullah was
asked the password. He gave the wrong one and immediately real-
ized he was trapped by people who were not from his own Pashtu
tribe. His driver executed a screeching U-turn, doubled back at
high speed, and made for the UN compound, the only place that
could guarantee his safety’ (Picco, 1999: 38).
With Najibullah off the scene, it remained only to arrange a
transfer of power. Two distinct processes played out. The first
process was a standoff in the Kabul area, where both Massoud and
Hekmatyar had forces. Massoud, wary of accusations of
Bonapartism, especially from Pushtun commanders from within
the National Commanders Shura (Akram, 1996: 385–6), resisted
the temptation to enter Kabul, but did commence discussion with
Wakil, who had scathingly denounced Najibullah, after his attempt
to leave the country, as ‘a hated dictator who had been an obstacle
to peace’ (Gargan, 1992b), and Mazdak, who had taken over as
Hezb-e Watanleader. Hekmatyar, on the other hand, was desperate
to seize Kabul as his capital. The second process was a prolonged
series of negotiations in Peshawar between the different Sunni
party leaders to reach an accord on power sharing in a new gov-
ernment. The two processes came together in the last week of
April. Late on Friday 24 April, a partial agreement was reached by
all the main Sunni leaders – except Hekmatyar – for a transition
process. But on the same day, Hekmatyar had begun to smuggle
troops into Kabul in cooperation with Khalqis in the Interior
Minister, and the next day, as Bradsher puts it, he ‘claimed control
The Interregnum of Najibullah, 1989–1992 191