the UN Security Council issued a statement welcoming ‘the
acceptance by the warring parties and other Afghan representatives
of a step-by-step process of national reconciliation through
the establishment of a fully representative and broad-based
Authoritative Council which would: (i) negotiate and oversee a
cease-fire, (ii) establish a national security force to collect and
safeguard heavy weapons and provide for security throughout the
country, and (iii) form a transitional government to lay the ground-
work for a democratically chosen government, possibly
utilizing traditional decision-making structures such as a “Grand
Assembly”’ (United Nations Security Council, 1994).
Unfortunately, Mestiri at this point proceeded in a manner which
was utterly detached from the ground realities in Afghanistan. When
the members of the Shura-i Hamahangimoved with massive force
against Rabbani on 1 January 1994, one of the things which they did
in the process was tear up the Peshawar and Islamabad Accords.
Having done so, but then having failed in their efforts to oust
Rabbani by military means, they were hardly in a position to resur-
rect the two accords and demand that Rabbani stand down in
mid–1994 in accordance with their provisions. Yet this essentially
was the position that Mestiri was to adopt. Indeed, he went so far as
to express to journalists the view that he confronted ‘a very difficult
task – to wrest power from Mr Rabbani’ (Reuters, 18 March 1995).
There was no prospect whatever that this would happen. Mestiri had
no capacity himself to wrest power from anyone, and because he
had failed up to that point to secure any commitment from the
Taliban to accept the UN’s plans, Rabbani would have been mad to
accede to his demands.
Oddly enough, there may have been at this time a small opening
for negotiation between Rabbani and some elements of the Taliban
(Maley, 1998d: 192), but Mestiri made no effort to exploit it.
Instead, he rounded on Rabbani, and at a Donors’ Conference for
Afghanistan held in Stockholm in June 1995 by the United Nations
Development Programme, he managed with one speech to destroy
his own credibility. He did not appear to have had proper speech
notes; in the text which was supplied to foreign missions, some
The Rise and Fall of the Rabbani Government, 1992–1996 211