states in prolonging the Afghan conflict: without some understand-
ings to insulate Afghan politics from wider regional rivalries, his
plans had little hope of succeeding. Third, he offered no solution to
the problem of statecollapse.
REGIME DECAY
From its high point in 1995, Rabbani’s government embarked on a
process of decay, which culminated in its displacement by the
Taliban in September 1996. Four factors accounted for its failure.
The first, but least important, was factionalism within the Jamiat-e
Islami. The second was a failure to find moderate Pushtuns with
whom to ally. The third was Rabbani’s serious error of judgment in
reaching a rapprochement with Hekmatyar. The fourth, and most
significant, was backing for the Taliban from Pakistan and from
Osama Bin Laden for a further bid to take over Kabul, at a time
when Rabbani lacked a committed external patron and the USA
was indifferent to his fate.
Politics in Kabul
The absence of a functioning state gave rise to a politics in Kabul
based not so much on institutions as on personal connections.
Within the Jamiat-e Islamithere were a number of factions, based
on attachments to particular individuals. The strongest group con-
sisted of Panjsheris loyal to Massoud, many of whom had spent
years working with him in the Panjsher Valley. Rabbani, who had
spent most of the war in Pakistan, had a following of his own,
from the Jamiat party bureaucracy and ‘Interim Government’;
these tended to be non-Panjsheris, with a number coming from
Rabbani’s old province of Badakhshan (Saikal, 1998a: 34–7).
There were also some very talented non-aligned persons, reflect-
ing the attraction that the Jamiathad held for moderate Islamist
intellectuals. Unfortunately, while there were some highly skilled
and dedicated figures in the upper echelons of the regime, who
The Rise and Fall of the Rabbani Government, 1992–1996 213