This came at a time when the government’s position was
increasingly stretched. When the communist regime fell, Massoud,
alone among the Mujahideen commanders, ‘lacked a powerful for-
eign patron’ (Rubin, 1995a: 274). This did not substantially change
over the intervening period: in 1995 a well-informed observer could
write that ‘Jamiat-e Islami is the only party involved which, so far,
is without any permanent foreign ally. The government, which is
controlled by Jamiat, has received some deliveries of aviation
petrol and other petroleum products from Saudi Arabia, but the
organization itself does not, as far as it is known, obtain any mili-
tary supplies from abroad’ (Fänge, 1995: 23). By 1996, the pos-
ition had improved somewhat, with new supplies coming in from
Russia and Iran (Rashid, 1996), and after the death of Mazari, Iran
sought to improve relations with Kabul across the board. But this
brought few direct benefits, and actually caused a chill in relations
with the United States, which Massoud was keen to develop. In
August 1996, US Assistant Secretary of State for South Asia,
Robin Raphel had demanded that Iran ‘should stop supplying
Kabul’ (Crosslines Global Report, nos 22–3, 1996: 13). Only the
Taliban stood to benefit from such a demand.
The end came suddenly. Jalalabad was occupied by the Taliban
on 11–12 September. They pushed on at high speed and took
Sarobi on 24 September. The situation for Kabul was now critical,
and at 3 pm on 26 September, Massoud ordered his forces to
evacuate the capital, an exercise which was accomplished with
brilliant dexterity. The door was open for the Taliban, and they
roared through it. On 27 September 1996, Kabul awoke to a new
era. It was to be a new era for the wider world as well.
The Rise and Fall of the Rabbani Government, 1992–1996 217