should be free of factions’ (BBC Newshour, 4 October 1996). This
was true only in the sense that she wanted a pro-Pakistan faction to
eliminate other power holders in Afghanistan. In 1996, she again
lost office, to Nawaz Sharif, and subsequent revelations about mis-
rule during her tenure (Burns, 1998) made her return to power in
the foreseeable future unlikely. But by then, her government had let
loose forces in Afghanistan which were to have a profound effect
not only on that country, but also her own.
Whether the Interior Minister or individual talibs made the first
move to establish a new political force is almost impossible to
determine, and may be lost forever in the mists of time: none of
those involved is likely to be a reliable witness. The Taliban, in
explanation of their emergence as a movement, stated that a Ghilzai
Pushtun mulla from Sangisar, Mulla Muhammad Omar, formerly
attached to the Hezb-e Islamiof Younos Khalis, had a dream in
which he was called to lead a campaign by ‘pure’ young students to
cleanse Afghanistan of the corruption and debauchery of warring
commanders (Sirrs, 2001b: 44). There is no doubt that corruption
and debauchery existed aplenty in the Kandahar area, but the
Mulla’s ‘dream’ had all the hallmarks of a foundational myth con-
cocted to legitimate a force which took shape for other purposes. It
contributed to a sentimental image of the Taliban which was
advanced by some eccentric Taliban defenders in the USA, notably
the journalist Nancy DeWolf Smith, whose preposterous ‘analysis’
now makes embarrassing reading (Smith, 1995). General Babar was
certainly involved from the outset in Taliban activities in
Afghanistan. On 20 October 1994, he had taken a group of Western
ambassadors (including the US Ambassador to Pakistan John C.
Monjo) to Kandahar, without even bothering to inform the Kabul
government, even though it manned an embassy in Islamabad (see
Rashid, 2000: 27; Kux, 2001: 335). France, to its credit, declined
the invitation (Dupaigne, 1995: 13). On 29 October 1994, a convoy
of trucks, including a notorious ISI officer, Sultan Amir (known by
thenom de guerre‘Colonel Imam’), and two figures who were later
to become prominent Taliban leaders, entered Afghanistan. The
convoy was held up by a group of commanders on 2 November.
220 The Afghanistan Wars