Kabul. The second was the Hazarajat region. And the third was
Dostam’s fiefdom based on Mazar-e Sharif. Dostam, in an act of
almost unparalleled foolishness, had sought to appease the Taliban
in 1995 by reaching an agreement with them pursuant to which he
provided technicians who repaired the aircraft they had captured in
Kandahar when they took it over. This gave them access to air
power (Rashid, 2000: 39). But on 10 October 1996, he struck a
new alliance with Massoud, Rabbani, and the Shiite leader
Muhammad Karim Khalili. With Mohseni’s Harakatand Sayyaf’s
Ittehad, this came to be known officially as the Jabha-i Muttahed-
e Islami Milli bara-i Nejat-e Afghanistan(‘National Islamic United
Front for the Salvation of Afghanistan’), but colloquially as the
Northern Alliance. From Dostam’s point of view, entering such an
alliance was a rational move, since it was inconceivable that the
Taliban would have accommodated him for more than a brief
period, but it did mean that he joined their list of targets.
In May 1997, the Taliban made their move. On 19 May, rumours
began to circulate that Dostam’s foreign affairs spokesman, General
Abdul Malik Pahlavan, had switched sides and joined the Taliban. I
was in Mazar-e Sharif at the time and can bear witness to the elec-
trifying effects of the rumours. Dostam was widely believed to have
been behind the assassination of Malik’s brother Rasul Pahlavan in
June 1996. Ismail Khan was in Malik’s territory at this time, and
Malik sought to establish his new credentials as a Taliban ally by
handing Ismail over to the Taliban. But it was clear that Pakistan
was behind the changes, since Malik would not have defected
unless he had received stronger guarantees than the Taliban could
give that he would remain in charge after Dostam was removed. On
24 May, fighting flared inside the city, and Dostam fled to Turkey.
On 25 May, Pakistan’s Foreign Minister Gohar Ayub announced
that Pakistan would grant diplomatic recognition to the Taliban. But
just three days later, on 28 May, the arrangement unravelled. Young
Taliban – obviously not privy to the subtler details of the Taliban’s
deal with Malik – tried to disarm some of Malik’s force, who
returned fire. More Taliban were killed by an anti-tank missile as
their truck headed towards the city centre, and a bloodbath occurred
The Rise and Rule of the Taliban, 1994-2001 229