course all fully aware of the disaster that had befallen the Soviet
Union in Afghanistan, and from the outset were determined to
avoid becoming involved in a large-scale land war in Afghanistan
in which the frontline combat role would be played by US person-
nel. The terrain militated against the kind of lightning land cam-
paign that had proved so effective at the end of Operation Desert
Storm in 1991, and Afghanistan’s landlocked character created sig-
nificant practical problems, especially given the hostility to the
USA of significant figures in Afghanistan’s western neighbour,
Iran. This suggested a need for allies of two types: first, states to
assist in various ways in the conduct of the more limited operation
that would be required, and second, partners on the ground in
Afghanistan to spearhead an ultimate ground assault against the
Taliban.
As to the former, there was no shortage of sympathetic states
whose own nationals had perished in the ruin of the World Trade
Center. The United Kingdom under Prime Minister Tony Blair
moved rapidly to stand by the United States, and other European
allies followed. The US’s partners in the NATO alliance took the
unprecedented step of formally invoking the provisions of Article 5
of the April 1949 North Atlantic Treaty, which provided that an
‘armed attack against one or more of them... shall be considered
an armed attack against them all’. Small-to-middle powers also
pledged support: the Australian Prime Minister, in Washington DC
on 11 September, and due to go to the polls within a matter of
months, supplied ‘Special Air Service’ troops to serve in
Afghanistan with US commandos.
The state which it was most important to bring into line was
Pakistan. Here, what the USA needed was not active support so
much as a complete and immediate end to Pakistan’s support for
the Taliban. Given the scale of the pressure which Washington
brought to bear on Islamabad – reportedly including the demand
that Pakistan declare itself either a friend or a foe (Dawn, 19
September 2001) – it was hardly surprising that President
Musharraf, in an address to the nation on 19 September, came out
in firm support of the US position. However, he had reasons of his
The Fall of the Taliban 259