(Schetter, 2001). It startled key allies (Chandrasekaran, 2001). It
also alarmed the United Front – Dr Abdullah responded that there
was ‘no such thing as moderate Taliban elements’ (Filkins, 2001a)
- and disposed its leaders to seize any opportunities which they
might encounter, rather than simply be a tool of US strategy.
They did not have long to wait, for within the space of four days
in November, key cities fell to anti-Taliban forces in a cascade.
Cascades occur when one event leads observers of what has hap-
pened to recalculate what is in their best interests, and they shift
allegiance accordingly. This was what happened in November. On 9
November, Mazar-e Sharif fell to groups led by Dostam, the Shiite
leader Ustad Mohaqqeq, and Commander Atta Muhammad. The
following day, United Front forces launched simultaneous attacks
across northern Afghanistan, in Khwajaghar, Eshkamesh, Baghlan,
Pul-e Khumri, Nahrin, Aibak, and Bamiyan. All fell, as did Hairatan
and Shibarghan to Dostam’s forces. Maimana fell on 11 November,
and Herat on 12 November. On the same day, the Shura-i Nazar
forces launched an attack on the frontlines north of Kabul. Pakistani
spokesmen urged the United Front not to enter Kabul – from the
United Front’s perspective an impertinence akin to retreating
Germans urging de Gaulle not to enter Paris in August 1944 – but
the following day the Taliban fled the city, looting the main
currency market and the Da Afghanistan Bank as they left
(Richburg, 2001). The United Front then occupied Kabul unop-
posed. This was criticised by Zahir Shah’s adviser Abdul Sattar Sirat
(Reuters, 13 November 2001), but in reality there was no alterna-
tive: disorder would have broken out in the city had the forces not
made their move. There were scenes of ecstatic celebration in Kabul
as the new forces arrived. ‘Almost all people in Kabul regard the
demise of the Taliban as a liberation’, reported the BBC’s Kate
Clark (BBC Newshour, 13 November 2001). Huge crowds gathered
shouting ‘Death to the Taliban’ and ‘Death to Pakistan’. On 22
November, Pakistan bowed to the inevitable and closed down the
Taliban Embassy in Islamabad (Glasser and Khan, 2001).
The main battles of the war were not quite over. The cascade had
ended Taliban rule in most of the areas in which Pushtuns were
The Fall of the Taliban 265