work of rules exists to ensure the obedience of those conscripted
for military service. In a fluid situation such as that in Afghanistan
after the Soviet invasion, mechanisms of rule-application tend to
break down, and evasion of conscription becomes a realistic
option. Where a nation stands united behind a cause, this is less of
a problem: volunteers can be trusted to replenish the Army’s man-
power. However, where a regime’s reservoirs of legitimacy are
low, the result is likely to be a crisis of military efficiency.
Halliday and Tanin rightly conclude that the Soviet invasion ‘great-
ly weakened the armed forces’ (Halliday and Tanin, 1998: 1364).
Giustozzi’s analysis suggests a reason for this: ‘to the ordinary
Afghan it was difficult to imagine why he should fight for a
Revolution which had only meant trouble for him and his family’
(Giustozzi, 2000: 108). As is commonly the case where regimes
are unpopular and mechanisms of control are feeble, ‘ghost pay-
rolling’ reportedly occurred (Giustozzi, 2000: 93), casting doubt on
the veracity of official figures as to troop strength. Beyond this, the
Afghan armed forces continued to be plagued by Khalq–Parcham
rivalry, and while Karmal was a Parchami, a purge of the Khalq
members was not a realistic option, since it would have left too
large a hole in the officer corps. All in all, the task of putting in
place a viable regime, so deceptively straightforward on paper,
proved in practice to be a nightmare.
Andropov’s concern for ‘strengthening relations of the party and
government with the masses’ was ostensibly well-judged, and in
other circumstances would have described a fruitful path for the
Soviets and the Karmal regime to follow. However, there was a
deep tension between, on the one hand, the pursuit of such an
approach by the regime, and on the other, the regime’s dependence
upon Soviet military support. The Soviet military was trained to be
a coerciveforce, and used coercion to entrench Karmal’s position.
Yet the more it did so, the more it compromised Karmal’s ability to
exercise legitimate domination, since what it won for him was
merely prudentially-based compliance. This was a poor substitute
for genuine popular support. As the events of 1989 were to reveal,
the ruling regimes in the Warsaw Pact states of Eastern Europe
Soviet Strategy, Tactics, and Dilemmas 45