The two armies confronted one another near Halmyros, in Thessaly,
on 15 March 1311.^181 Whilst the‘Frankish’host was not 30,000-strong
(as is said by Muntaner), it was clearly quite large, spear-headed by
around 700 knights from across Angevin Greece and beyond.^182 The
Company army seems to have been rather fewer, numbering perhaps
8,000 men (although this may not include thefive hundred, hand-picked
by Walter, who deserted to join their comrades).^183 TheChronicle of the
Moreatells us that the Catalans‘apologized submissively to the duke’,
but Walter prepared for battle anyway,‘from arrogance, which is a trait of
the Franks, and from bad advice, which others gave him’.^184 The duke’s
confidence was misplaced. He had not anticipated the difficulties of the
marshy terrain, which duly crippled the Frankish charge. As a result,
it was possible to pin the blame for the catastrophe entirely on the
commander himself.^185 In short, it was a terrible reiteration of the battle
of Courtrai, less than a decade earlier.^186 Survivors were few, but they
included Walter’s brother-in-law, Niccolò Sanudo.^187 The aftermath of
the battle is well-known. The Company seized control of almost the
entire duchy, placing themselves under the suzerainty of the Aragonese
king of Sicily. Muntaner describes the division process with gusto:
‘[the mercenaries] divided the city of Thebes and all the towns and
castles of the duchy among themselves. And they gave noble ladies in
marriage to the members of the Company, to each according to his
degree–and to some they gave so distinguished a lady that he was not
even worthy to bring her water with which to wash her hands’.^188 Only
Argos and Nafplio held out, sustained by the staunch loyalty of the house
of Foucherolles.^189
Muntaner provides us with a particularly telling vignette of the battle’s
opening moves. He states that, as the armies lined up tofight, the
Company’s sizeable Turkish contingent assembled rather separately
from the rest. Apparently, the Turks feared that everything else was a
(^181) For the location of the battle, see Setton,Papacy and the Levant, i, 441–2n.3.
(^182) The Catalan Expedition to the East, ch. 45.
(^183) Ibid., ch. 45; and Setton,Catalan Domination of Athens,9.
(^184) Crusaders as Conquerors, 277.
(^185) See esp. K. DeVries,Infantry Warfare in the Early Fourteenth Century: Discipline, Tactics
and Technology(Woodbridge, 1996), 58–65.
(^186) A neat link is provided by Muntaner’s observation that Walter and his knights were
wearing golden spurs (The Catalan Expedition to the East, ch. 45).
(^187) Setton,Catalan Domination of Athens,11–12.
(^188) Adapted fromThe Catalan Expedition to the East, ch. 45.
(^189) See A. Luttrell,‘The Latins of Argos and Nauplia, 1311– 1394 ’, which can be found
most conveniently inLatin Greece, the Hospitallers and the Crusades, 1291– 1440 (London,
1982), essay no. 8, Appendix 2.
The Briennes of Lecce and Athens 139