Against this view of feudal obligations, we have the different formulation of Fulbert of
Chartres (1020), who wrote in purely negative terms, listing the things that a man should
not do against his lord. Aside from the fact that Fulbert was writing at a time when feudal
institutions were just coming into being as a response to public disorder, it is probable
that obligations did vary enormously according to the de facto power of the parties
involved. If a lord held a castle and his man did not, the feudal obligations of the latter
were considerable and were enforceable. If, however, the holder of a fief was himself a
castellan, the negative obligations described by Fulbert were as much as could be
expected unless, in a particular situation, a castellan perceived that self-interest required
him to attend his lord’s court or respond with troops to his military summons.
The de facto power of a party to a feudal relationship, and with it the character of
feudal obligations, could be altered dramatically if the holdings of one party were
inherited by a minor or subject to a disputed succession. When succession to a fief was in
dispute, the lord could make strenuous demands as his price for investing the successful
claimant with the fief. If, however, the lord’s position was disputed or fell to a minor heir,
those who owed homage gained unusual leverage because their support was so sorely
needed.
When it came into being in the 11th century as a revival and reformulation of much
older practices, feudalism was an ad hoc attempt to cope with the disappearance of public
courts and public order. As a device for regulating the relationships among the members
of a violent military elite through a network of private contracts, it proved to be a flexible
tool for reconstructing a system of public order. By the later 12th century, the French
kings and territorial princes had found it a useful system for consolidating their power
and providing a framework within which professional soldiers, paid officials, and public
courts could be reintroduced. When, in the 13th century, feudal institutions were being
elaborated in the legal sources, they were already becoming archaic, since military
power, judicial authority, and the maintenance of public order no longer depended
primarily on private relationships based on the fief. Nevertheless, the outlook of the
nobility and the assumptions that gave rise to the representative and fiscal institutions of
the 14th century remained strongly influenced by the feudalism of the 12th.
John Bell Henneman, Jr.
[See also: ABRÈGEMENT DU FIEF; ALLEU/ALLOD; BENEFICE
(NONECCLESIASTICAL); CONSEIL; FEALTY; FEUDAL AIDS; FEUDAL
INCIDENTS; FIEF/FEUDUM; FIEF HOLDING; FIEF-RENTE; HOMAGE;
INVESTITURE (FEUDAL); MOUVANCE; VASSAL]
Brown, Elizabeth A.R. “The Tyranny of a Construct: Feudalism and Historians of Medieval
Europe.” American Historical Review 79(1974):1063–88.
Duby, Georges. La société aux XIe et XIIe siècles dans la région maconnaise. Paris: Colin, 1953.
Fourquin, Guy. Lordship and Feudalism in the Middle Ages, trans. Iris and A.L.Lytton Sells. New
York: Pica, 1976.
Ganshof, François L. Feudalism, trans. Philip Grierson. London: Longman, 1952.
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