Koreans Becoming a Soviet People 101NKVD order, they are not going to be accepted.... This is when the
involuntary thought arises that a strug gle against the Chinese seems to be a
plus for the Koreans and consequently for Japan. We should connect these
two questions together.... Due to the economic motives of the region’s
character, we cannot forget the po liti cal essence of the [Chinese] question.
If it is in such a way [its current form], then it can never be connected with
the general situation so as to put pressure on the Chinese [eviction from
t he reg ion].^87Geitsman’s report was sent to Dalbureau (Dalkraikom) and NKID in Mos-
cow. He deliberately increased the alien and the alarmist aspects of his re-
port by quoting Soviet Korean passport numbers and not the number of
Soviet citizens among the Koreans. In 1928, there may have been only 7,000
Soviet Koreans issued passports by the Passport Division of the NKVD.
However, t here were 84,931 Koreans who were Soviet citizens in 1926 (out
of a total population of 168,009, roughly 50 percent).^88 In 1928, it was likely
that 60–70 percent of the total Korean population (120,000 of the 200,000)
were citizens because of the simplified citizenship mea sures enacted in the
Primore through the collectivization of the Koreans on state artels, com-
munes, and small collectives that began in 1926 (see Chapter 4, Soviet citi-
zenship). Second, passportization only began as a large- scale standardized
pro cess sometime in 1932–1933 in the RFE.^89
Geitsman’s report seemed to be extremely careful in its assessment of
the OGPU’s campaign against the Chinese NEPmen (small merchants,
traders, and in de pen dent businessmen) in 1928.^90 The NKID typically han-
dled the repercussions of the OGPU campaigns against the Chinese NEPmen
because the majority of the latter were foreign citizens. Geitsman expressed
remorse over the evictions of the Chinese craftsmen, because they were pro-
letariat who were earning their living by their craft and labor. Unfortu-
nately, the OGPU had confiscated all the workshops, goods, and earnings
from these men even though they were working legally and had all of the
necessary paperwork. Geitsman confirmed this, stating: “They [the Chinese
consulate] reported that two months ago they [the craftsmen] obtained a new
license; if the Soviet authorities did not want their work, then why were they
given the approval and license to do such work? The authorities should have
warned them and they would have closed their shops and gone home.” How-
ever, Geitsman did not feel remorse for the deportation of the Chinese cur-
rency speculators who, in his opinion, were “all from the wealthy class.” The
OGPU campaign was to have been based on solely anticapitalist (marking
the end of Lenin’s NEP, New Economic Policy) concepts. It was summa-
rized by the following statement: “Essentially, the question remains thusly,