224 honored by the glory of islam
him to tie it well.^51 The executioner tugged at the ropes two or three times, and
the former grand vizier expired. The body was taken out to an old tent, where
they prepared the corpse for burial, performed the funeral prayers, and then
cut off the head, buried the body in the courtyard of the mosque opposite the
palace, and sent the head to Mehmed IV in Edirne. First it was placed at the
palace gate to serve as a warning to others, then it was buried in the courtyard
of a local mosque. Hüseyin Behçeti, who had written the Ascent of Victory in
celebration of Kara Mustafa Pasha’s conquest of Çehrin and in praise of Vani
Mehmed Efendi’s incitement to jihad four long years before the rout at Vienna,
died soon after in Belgrade after having retreated from the front with the army
and his patron.
One of those who safely returned with the army to Edirne after setting out
with the sultan to Belgrade was a twenty-fi ve-year-old who served in the royal
laundry as one of those in charge of the sultan’s linen.^52 Before his retirement
from royal service in 1 703, he became the sword bearer (silahdar) of Ahmed III,
and that is the name attached to the history he wrote as a continuation of Katip
Çelebi’s narration of Ottoman history. Although Silahdar used The Events of
Vienna as a source for his account, he adopted a critical tone toward the grand
vizier (2:42–94). With the benefi t of many years’ hindsight, when discussing
the beginning of the campaign he complains that Kara Mustafa Pasha failed to
bring large cannons and mortar and enough fi repower to conquer the citadel,
the same mistake Ottoman planners had initially made during the Candia cam-
paign. This was particularly inexcusable to the author at a time when the em-
pire was at the peak of its economic and military strength with enough wealth
and matériel to sustain a larger campaign. Silahdar infers that the grand vizier
thought he could conquer Vienna without the requisite war and bloodshed. In
his entries for the last weeks of August, Silahdar argues that the grand vizier
had already been told that the army did not have enough ammunition to subdue
the citadel, that Vienna was especially well fortifi ed, and that the longer it was
besieged the harder it would be to take it, especially because the enemy was
being reinforced while Ottoman forces faced deprivation. He complains that the
grand vizier could have avoided the fi asco if he took Yanık and stopped there;
doing so would have made the emperor desire a peace treaty. Or he could have
surrounded Vienna in all directions rather than going straight before its citadel.
Silahdar claims that if the Ottoman military had put pressure on the city in that
fashion, Vienna would have fallen without a battle. He also puts words to this
effect in the mouths of the grand vizier’s commanders, who at the end of August
stated that they were badly outnumbered and requested tens of thousands of ad-
ditional troops; yet Kara Mustafa Pasha failed to fulfi ll his promise to send more
troops, leaving the beleaguered Ottoman armed forces to their fate. Silahdar