Honored by the Glory of Islam. Conversion and Conquest in Ottoman Europe

a decade of crisis 55

disgusted by the war, grew cold to battle, had no strength to take the citadel,

were tired of living on false hopes, recognized their powerlessness, and faced

a seemingly countless enemy without salary, reinforcements, or provisions.

Withering under a constant barrage of enemy fi re, their earthworks fi lled with

winter rain, they lost all will to fi ght with the latest arrival of enemy reinforce-

ments.^85 When Ottoman forces arrived to drop off supplies, seeing the enemy

ships nearby they would panic and quickly set sail again, fl eeing so quickly

that they would not deposit all the soldiers. The disgorged soldiers did not

have time to take their provisions, rain gear, or weapons, and soldiers already

on the island would curse the cowards.^86 Contrary to statute, Karaçelebizade

states that the Janissaries “who had been on that unfortunate island” for years

without relief were known to take the fl eet and return to Istanbul. By 1 652,

Karaçelebizade could describe the campaign as “not blessed,” because the Ot-

toman forces could do nothing to stop the Venetians. While “the sultanic treas-

ury was forsaken of seeing the countenance of a silver or gold coin, the soldiers

of Islam were hungry and desolate, stuck on that island for years, crying for

help, lost in the calamity of exile, pain, anxiety, grief and homesickness.” This

caused “the honor of the manifest religion [Islam] to be broken.”^87

While the grand viziers that held offi ce during Mehmed IV’s fi rst eight

years in power were overwhelmed trying to solve fi nancial defi ciencies, put

down rebellion, and bring about order in the imperial dominions, Venetian

naval victories and occupation of islands crucial to the defense of the imperial

capital became the clearest indicators of Ottoman military crisis. Naval battles

between ships that caused “the vault of heaven to fi ll with the clamerous sound

of cannonfi re” usually did not go the Ottoman way. Ottoman admirals were

accused of being cowards when facing the enemy (but being happy to oppress

and pillage Ottoman commoners), of having poor battle plans and no backup

plans, which caused the sinking of many ships and the loss of many command-

ers.^88 War with Venice dragged on and constant news of routs fi lled the popula-

tion of Istanbul with sorrow and stress and placed them at direct risk.

To Karaçelebizade, it became an issue of male honor. Facing the humilia-

tion of being routed by the infi dels, it was crucial to raise “a proud navy” that

would not “fl ee in the direction of the wind, be impotent with crushed honor,”

or be led by commanders who would “hand over their ships to save their own

necks.”^89 It is not surprising that there were eighteen admirals of the navy from

the start of the Crete campaign in 1 645 through the end of 1 656.^90 Karaçelebi-

zade complained that the “overpowering whip of the sultanate” and capital pun-

ishment were not used to sternly punish these commanders and make them

public examples; instead, despite the terrible situation, their actions were not

even frowned upon.^91