125 THE SEVEN YEARS WAR, 1756-63at the ZlaU Slunce. From here the ridge appeared not so much to run
parallel to the Kaiser-Strasse as to descend slant-wise to meet it a
couple of miles to the east. This was the deceptive effect of the low
spurs which projected to the north around Krzeczhorz. Nothing could
have seemed more natural than to continue the march down the
excellent Kaiser-Strasse across the front of the Austrian position, and
then ascend the heights and gain the enemy right or eastern flank.
The stalwart Major-General Hiilsen was to lead the way with the
infantry of the advance guard and the Stechow Dragoons (D 11; see
Map 10, p. 352), leaving the road just after passing on a level with
Krzeczhorz, and then working around and behind this village to form
a line facing west on the ridge. Lieutenant-General Zieten was to
cover his left flank with fifty squadrons of light horse, and one
hundred further squadrons of cavalry were to be close at hand
alongside the leading divisions of infantiy, following in Hiilsen's
tracks. The rearward or right-hand divisions of the army were to be
'refused', in the classic style of the oblique order of battle. The cavalry
at the tail was made of the merest handful of regiments, in contrast
with the large force which had waited uselessly at Prague.
Frederick gave his generals a verbal briefing on the upper floor of
the Zlat6 Slunce, indicating features of the ground through the
windows. He then entered a nearby room and repeated the details to
the generals' adjutants. He explained that for the first time in his
battles he would hold the cavalry in reserve, so that it would remain
fresh enough to exploit the success of the infantry. He left the inn
early in the afternoon, mounted his horse and drew his sword,
'something which he had never done before' (Warnery, 1788, 151).
The extraordinary complexities of the battle of Kolin were never
convincingly unravelled until Hoen wrote on the subject in 1911. In
outline, however, we shall describe two phases of combat, namely:
(a) when the intended flanking attack of the Prussians was con-
verted, by Frederick's last-minute changes of mind, into a fron-
tal one, and
(b) when the Prussians repeatedly opened potential breaches in the
enemy line, only to fail in face of the tenacity and superior
numbers of the Austrians.
The Prussians moved off to the left in lines at about 1 p.m.
Zieten's hussars and Hiilsen's battalions were passing on a level with
Krzeczhorz when they came under fire from the miniature artillery of
a force of Croats - an incident which told Frederick that, contrary to
expectations, this village was occupied by the enemy. Frederick
decided to await news of Hiilsen's further progress, and he ordered the
army to halt on the Kaiser-Strasse: 'You could not have imagined a