268 THE WAR OF THE BAVARIAN SUCCESSION, 1778-9
strategic satellite of Prussia, and in March the king sent Colonel
Johann Christoph von Zegelin to Dresden in order to work out a
detailed scheme of military co-operation. In the subsequent talks the
Saxons agreed to allow the Prussians free access to their territory, and
to support their operations with about 20,000 Saxon troops. The
Prusso-Saxon force on this western flank amounted to 85,000 men,
and Frederick chose Prince Henry for the command. Another 87,000
troops were to constitute the royal army in Silesia.
The plan of operations was based closely on the case of an
offensive war against the Austrian monarchy, as outlined in the
Reflexions of 1775. The objective in both schemes was to conquer
Bohemia by means of a careful balance of invasions across widely
separated sectors of the Austrian frontiers. (See Map 28, p. 380.)
The grand diversionary thrust into Moravia was the responsibil-
ity of the royal army, and before it got under way Frederick planned
to make a smaller demonstration, or reconnaissance in force, by a
mass of cavalry moving from Glatz into north-east Bohemia in the
direction of Koniggratz. Frederick knew nothing for certain about the
location of the Austrian forces, but he was confident that they would
be sucked eastwards by the programme of diversions, leaving Henry
with a clear run from Saxony to the neighbourhood of Prague.
Frederick hoped that the element of Russian support, which was an
important feature of the plan of 1775, would be provided by an
auxiliary corps of 30,000 troops operating against Austrian Poland.
(He retained his trust in Russian help until 1 October, by which time
active hostilities were nearly over.)
There were soon indications that all was not going to go well
with the war. Unlike the Austrians, Frederick had made no arrange-
ments to assemble the nucleus of a supply train in peacetime, and
now with the approach of active operations he was forced to reconsti-
tute the whole apparatus from the beginning. In the event, the
arrangements for moving not just the supplies, but the immense
artillery train of 915 pieces, began to collapse even before hostilities
broke out. Goethe enthused at the scenes of lively commotion in the
capital, but to a military eye the gathering of the Berlin artillery
resembled nothing so much as'the bringing together of a caravan...
intended to transport a multitude of tradesmen's goods to some
market place or other' (quoted in Jany, 1928-9, III, 114).
Prince Henry predicted that 'these enormous masses which are
piling up on either side will reduce each other to a defensive... If one
or other of the parties tries to force the issue it will acquire a certain
amount of glory - and lose one-third of its troops in the process' (to
Frederick, 10 March, PC 26085). Frederick was aware that endless
trains of Austrian artillery were reported to be moving into Bohemia,