302 FREDERICK AND WAR
Whereas in peacetime the Austrian and Russian troops, and
especially their regiments of cavalry, were scattered in distant quar-
ters for the sake of ease of subsistence, Frederick had it in his power to
effect sudden concentrations of force in Brandenburg and Silesia, and
reach the heart of Saxony or Bohemia before the enemy could
mobilise. He was under no obligation to consult ministers or allies,
and his regiments were expected to be able to march within six days
of receiving the appropriate order, 'the consequence of which is, that
the Prussian army is the best disciplined, and the readiest for service
at a minute's warning of any now in the world, or perhaps that ever
was in it' (Moore, 1779, II, 147-8). Frederick never lost the great
advantages he gained from being the first into Silesia in 1740 and the
first into Saxony in 1756.
Frederick wrote frequently and eloquently about the advantages
of offensive action, and never more so than when he was seeking to
instil energy into his commanders: 'One of the falsest notions in war is
to remain on the defensive and let the enemy act offensively. In the
long run it is inevitable that the party which stays on the defensive
will lose' (to the Hereditary Prince of Brunswick, 8 January 1779, PC
27005; see also PC 8352, 8770,9781, 9823, 9839, 11357, 27140; 'Principes
Gen6raux', 1748, Oeuvres, XXVIII, 8-9, 14, 61, 73, 76; 'Reflexions',
1775, Oeuvres, XXIX, 85; Warnery, 1788, 313).
How was it possible for the Prussians to wage war in such an
aggressive style when they laboured under an overall inferiority in
numbers? Frederick had a ready answer in his younger years, which
was to concentrate his forces and reach a speedy decision by battle
(see p. 309). This doctrine was clear and forceful, and Frederick
sought on many occasions to put it into effect in the Seven Years War,
as the veterans and the patriotic historians pointed out (PC 11150,
11274; Warnery, 1788, 343, 536-7; Retzow, 1802, I, 102; Bernhardi,
1881, I, 17; Gr. Gstb., 1901-14, VI, 57).
However, Frederick's emphasis on the offensive was neither
exclusive nor absolute. The Austrian generals certainly never talked
about the attack with such enthusiasm as did Frederick, and yet they
were the ones who took the initiative at Chotusitz, Soor, Moys,
Breslau, Hochkirch and Maxen, and who at Liegnitz planned to bring
about the complete destruction of the royal army. It is significant
that in the Seven Years War, when Frederick wrote about 'ridding
myself of an enemy', or 'a good decisive battle' (PC 9393, 10812), he
had in mind no longer 'the total annihilation of the enemy' ('Prin-
cipes G6n6raux', 1748, Oeuvres, XXVIII, 79-80), which was now
scarcely possible, but winning the time and freedom to redress a
deteriorating state of affairs at the other end of the theatre of war.
By the evening of 18 June 1757 Frederick knew that the war was