310 FREDERICK AND WAR
enemy were sited, the less willing they were to come out and disturb
him. Moreover, at Zorndorf, Kunersdorf and Torgau the extensive
woodlands helped to screen the movement from view, while offering
no great obstacle to the Prussian columns.
Once the heads of columns had gained enough ground, the army
formed into lines. This was usually accomplished by the simple and
almost instantaneous left or right wheel of platoons. The attack was
then delivered by a powerful concentration of forces, comprising an
advance guard, one or more lines of supporting infantry, a flank guard
of cavalry, and up to thirty or forty heavy pieces.
The corresponding 'refused' wing was an impressively long, but
actually rather thin line, which reached back from the attacking
wing in a staggered formation of echelons (Staffeln), which at
Leuthen consisted of units of two battalions at a time (the Oblique
Order in the narrower sense). The task of the refused wing was to fix
the enemy in position, and then, according as the battle went, to
exploit the victory or cover the retreat (on the Oblique Order in
General: 'Instruction fur die General-Majors von der Infanterie',
1748, Oeuvres, XXX, 157; 'Instruction' for Lehwaldt, 23 June 1756,
Oeuvres, XXX, 206; 'Ordre' to Dohna, 20 July 1758, Oeuvres, XXVIII,
159-60; 'Instruction fiir die General-Majors von der Infanterie', 1759,
Oeuvres, XXX, 266-7; 'Castram&rie', 1770, Oeuvres, XXIX, 25; 'Testa-
ment Politique', 1768, in Frederick, 1920, 144; PC 10103, 10152, 11150,
11238; Anon., 1772, I, 71; Guibert, 1778, 127; Toulongeon (1786),
1881, 200; Warnery, 1788, 112-13; Scharnhorst, 1794, 117; Lossow,
1826, 336).
Two principles appear to have shaped the Oblique Order. First
there was the ambition to concentrate overwhelming force on a
vulnerable point, which would render it possible for a small army like
the Prussian to gain a local superiority.
The second was Frederick's desire to exert the greatest possible
control throughout the battle. In military affairs the divorce between
intention and reality is notorious, and Frederick might have been
speaking for all commanders at all times when he talked with Catt
after Zorndorf:
Frederick: That was a diabolical day. Did you understand what was
going on?
Catt: Your Majesty, I had a good grasp of the preliminary march,
and the first arrangements for the battle. But all the rest escaped
me. I could make no sense of the various movements.
Frederick: You were not the only one, my dear friend. Console
yourself, you weren't the only one! (Catt, 1884, 162)
The management of large-scale battles was more than usually diffi-