325 FREDERICK AND WARfrom Seydlitz. 'When the king placed his left boot in the stirrup this
man was very clever at taking him under the arm in a discreet way,
and helping him to swing up into the saddle' (Nicolai, 1788-92, IV,
47).
The one physical disability of Frederick in his prime was short-
ness of sight, as befitted a scholar. At Lobositz he was forced to ask
Ferdinand of Brunswick what he could see of the second cavalry
attack, and after the war he admitted his failing to the Prince de
Ligne, and explained that he used his telescope as a corrective.
However, by coup d'oeil the eighteenth century understood not
sharpness of eyesight, but the capacity for rapid orientation, judg-
ment and decision which enabled a commander to exploit all the
potentialities of the ground. Frederick explained that 'it is possible to
learn and perfect this talent, providing you have an innate aptitude
for war. The foundation of this coup d'oeil is beyond doubt the art of
fortification' ('Principes G6neraux', 1748, Oeuvres, XXVIII, 25).
At the time of Frederick's wars a commander's personal know-
ledge of the terrain was of an importance which we can scarcely
imagine at the present day. It was no coincidence that at Kolin the
Austrians beat Frederick on the scene of their peacetime manoeuvres,
or that the Prussians repaid them in the same coin at Leuthen. This
knowledge was an attribute as valuable as skill in manoeuvre or the
capacity to maintain discipline. The name of Fouqu6 was associated
with the topography of the County of Glatz, just as Zieten and Hiilsen
were at home in the neighbourhood of Meissen. As for Frederick,
He was no friend of geometry, and perhaps he did not know very
much about it. But that defect was compensated for by the vivid
impression that was made on him by the forms of visible
objects, by the completeness with which his memory could
conjure up that vision, and the accuracy and detail that
remained in his imagination. All of this enabled him to select
the plan of battle best calculated to seize on all the advantages
of a given locality. (Garve, 1798, 135)Second-hand information was no substitute. Frederick might
require officers to draw up topographical memoranda, like the one he
requested of Carl C. von Schmettau in the campaign of Chotusitz,
and he consulted local foresters before the battles of Zorndorf,
Kunersdorf and Torgau. At the same time he warned his officers that
'a peasant and a drover are not military men, and you will find that
quite different descriptions of the same stretch of country will be
given by an economist, a carter, a huntsman or a soldier' ('Des
Marches d'Armee', 1777, Oeuvres, XXIX, 116).
In 1742 Frederick established a Plankammer in the Stadtschloss