57 THE SILESIAN WARS, 1740-5hung upon the battleworthiness of his army, and more specifically
the infantry. In the strategic dimension, his record was still one of
almost unrelieved failure. His rapid progresses in December 1740,
February 1742 and September 1744 looked impressive enough on the
map, but they amounted to little more than promenades into an
empty countryside. Once the main Austrian army arrived on the
theatre of operations, Frederick was forced on every occasion to
conform with the strategic initiatives of the enemy.
The destructive effects of the campaign of 1744 were felt through the
winter and well into the following spring, and the task of restoring
the shattered army was aggravated by a series of skirmishes along the
borders of Glatz and Upper Silesia.
Frederick took energetic measures to draw recruits from the
cantons and abroad, but the approach of the campaigning season of
1745 found him still short of 8,000 infantry and 700 cavalry. Money
too was a matter of concern. This was a fallow period in the Prussian
finances, since the resources inherited from Frederick William were
at last exhausted, and Frederick still had to build up the reserves and
the structures that were to support him so effectively through the
Seven Years War. He was unable to raise a loan on the Dutch money
market, and the Stande (the provincial assemblies of the nobility)
were able to contribute little more than one-fifth of his needs.
Frederick employed promotions, cash grants, and judicious re-
bukes in an attempt to restore enthusiasm and a sense of purpose in
the army. 'Is this the right moment to ask to resign?' he challenged
Lieutenant-General Kalckstein. 'I had always assumed that you were
devoted to the state, and it never crossed my mind that you could
wish to remove yourself when things are going so badly with us' (Gr.
Gstrf, 1895, II, 124). All the time it was evident that confidence could
be restored only through some success in the open field.
Frederick decided to stage this encounter inside Prussian terri-
tory since, for the first time in his career, he renounced the ambition
of carrying the war to the enemy - he knew that his troops and his
finances were not up to the ordeal. He therefore told the French that
they must assume the active role in 1745, by establishing an army of
60,000 men in western Germany, and sending another 60,000 troops
down the Danube against Vienna (PC 1738). On his own theatre, 'if
the Austrians come at me, I shall let them cross the hills in peace,
after which I shall march directly against them... Prince Charles
will have no adviser [i.e. no Traun] at his side during this campaign,
and there is a good chance that he will make some stupid mistakes'
(PC 1781, 1796).
The clouded face of diplomatic affairs also indicated caution.