cluded that a strategic opening to Iran
was a worthwhile objective, but that the
U.S. government should not have en-
gaged in an arms-for-hostages deal when
it ran against its own policy of refusing to
deal with terrorists and because its ac-
tions might serve as an incentive for fur-
ther kidnappings.
Concerning aid to the Contras, the
commission was undecided as to whether
the congressional ban applied to the
NSC staff, but it questioned the aid on
the grounds that, if disclosed, it could
jeopardize the Reagan administration’s
pro-Contra position. The commission
criticized the NSC staff members respon-
sible for the Iran-Contra affair for run-
ning a highly unprofessional operation
and also cast an unfavorable light on
Reagan, who, while he had not been in-
volved in any effort to cover up the facts,
had failed to exercise sufficient care in
overseeing the implementation of U.S.
foreign policy.
Impact The Iran-Contra affair was the
crowning government scandal of the
1980’s and, for a time, appeared to
threaten Reagan’s political future. Had
he been forced from the presidency, or
even remained under a lingering cloud
of suspicion, especially just a decade af-
ter President Richard M. Nixon’s res-
ignation in the wake of the Watergate
scandal, the American political scene
could have faced a very uncertain future.
The Tower Commission accomplished
the difficult feat of conducting both a speedy and
evenhanded investigation that, while shedding an
unflattering light on Reagan’s administrative style,
pinpointed the principals behind the Iran-Contra
affair at the staff level of the National Security Coun-
cil. The commission built a solid foundation for the
lengthier congressional and criminal investigations
that followed it and that produced a fuller and more
detailed picture of the Iran-Contra affair.
Further Reading
Draper, Theodore.A Ver y Thin Line: The Iran-Contra
Affairs. New York: Hill & Wang, 1991. One of the
most detailed and comprehensive histories of the
Iran-Contra affair.
Tower, John.Consequences: A Personal and Political
Memoir. Boston: Little, Brown, 1991. Includes a
chapter on the author’s experiences as chair of
the Tower Commission.
Tower, John G., Edmund S. Muskie, and Brent
Scowcroft.The Tower Commission Report: The Full
Text of the President’s Special Review Board. New York:
Bantam Books, 1987. The report of the Tower
Commission as released to the public.
Walsh, Lawrence.Firewall: The Iran-Contra Conspiracy
and Cover-Up. New York: W. W. Norton, 1997. The978 Tower Commission The Eighties in America
In its report on the Iran-Contra affair, the Tower Commission cited
a “failure of responsibility” on the part of the principal members of
the National Security Council (NSC), as well as of President Ron-
ald Reagan, as set forth in this excerpt:The NSC system will not work unless the President makes it
work....
By his own account, as evidenced in his diary notes, and
as conveyed to the Board [Tower Commission] by his prin-
cipal advisors, President Reagan was deeply committed to
securing the release of the hostages. It was this intense
compassion for the hostages that appeared to motivate his
steadfast support of the Iran initiative, even in the face of
opposition from his Secretaries of State and Defense.
In his obvious commitment, the President appears to
have proceeded with a concept of the initiative that was not
accurately reflected in the reality of the operation. The
President did not seem to be aware of the way in which the
operation was implemented and the full consequences of
U.S. participation....
The President’s management style is to put the princi-
pal responsibility for policy review and implementation on
the shoulders of his advisors. Nevertheless, with such a
complex, high-risk operation and so much at stake, the
President should have insured that the NSC system did not
fail him. He did not force his policy to undergo the most
critical review of which the NSC participants and the pro-
cess were capable. At no time did he insist upon account-
ability and performance review. Had the President chosen
to drive the NSC. system, the outcome could well have
been different.The Tower Report