the sweeping deliberations over nuclear arms con-
trol issues.
Indeed, Gorbachev came to Reykjavik having re-
alized the need to end both the superpower arms
race and the ideological conflict with the Western
Bloc, as the rapidly declining Soviet economy was
in dire need of reform. Gorbachev soon showed
his hand, arguing in the opening sessions that the
two countries should agree to a 50 percent reduc-
tion in strategic nuclear arms, a total elimination of
all intermediate-range missiles deployed in Europe,
compulsory nonwithdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic
Missile (ABM) Treaty for a period of ten years, and a
complete ban on the testing of space-based anti-
ballistic defensive weapons, except in laboratories.
On October 12, Gorbachev sweetened the deal by
proposing to limit all intermediate-range missiles in
the Soviet and American arsenals to one hundred.
In the final, dramatic hours of the summit,
Gorbachev remarked to Reagan that he wanted to
rid their countries’ nuclear arsenals of all strategic
forces, not merely ballistic missiles. To that, Reagan
responded that he would agree to the elimination of
all nuclear arms, be they strategic, intermediate-
range, or tactical nuclear weaponry. It appeared that
a major, far-reaching compact on nuclear disarma-
ment was within sight.
Negotiations Break Down In the final hour, how-
ever, the talks collapsed when Gorbachev insisted
that Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI)—a
space-based, antiballistic defensive weapons system
unveiled in March, 1983, in order to make nuclear
weapons “impotent and obsolete”—be limited to re-
search and testing in a laboratory setting. The Soviet
leadership believed that the SDI program was being
developed in order to give the United States a first-
strike capability and to take the arms race into outer
space, not to provide a protective shield against nu-
clear attack as the Reagan administration claimed.
Reagan would not agree to limiting research, devel-
opment, and testing of the system within the frame-
work of the ABM Treaty, arguing that the SDI pro-
gram was the best insurance policy against the Soviet
Union reneging on arms reduction commitments.
Thus, the failure to find common ground on defen-
sive antiballistic systems caused the summit to end
without any agreement on nuclear arms control.
Impact Although the Reykjavik Summit ended
without the signing of an arms control treaty, the
meeting was of fundamental importance, as the
sweeping negotiations advanced the arms control
agenda significantly. Important breakthroughs made
at Reykjavik enabled the two leaders to sign an Inter-
mediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty the following
year at their third summit meeting, in Washington,
D.C. This accord was groundbreaking: For the first
time ever, an entire class of nuclear weapons was
eliminated from U.S. and Soviet arsenals. Likewise,
the Reykjavik discussions on strategic nuclear forces
eventually culminated in the first Strategic Arms Re-
duction Treaty (1991), the first arms agreement
signed by the two superpowers that eliminated stra-
tegic nuclear arms.
Another rarely discussed outcome of the Reykja-
vik Summit—one secured by the United States—was
the commitment made by the Soviets to have an on-
going discussion on human rights issues. Perhaps
the most significant result of Reykjavik was that the
meeting led to a greater level of trust between the
two superpowers; indeed, Gorbachev later claimed
that Reykjavik was the key turning point in the Cold
War, as it was the first time the leaders of the two
states met over an extended period of time and
talked about all outstanding issues of concern.Further Reading
Beschloss, Michael R., and Strobe Talbott.At the
Highest Levels: The Inside Stor y of the Cold War. Bos-
ton: Little, Brown, 1993. A historian and a jour-
nalist team up to examine the causes, conse-
quences, and denouement of the Cold War.
Goodby, James E.At the Borderline of Armageddon:
How American Presidents Managed the Atom Bomb.
Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2006. As a
participant in the arms control negotiations be-
tween the United States and the Soviet Union in
the early 1980’s, Goodby examines the negotiat-
ing positions, strategies, and achievements of past
U.S. presidents.
Gorbachev, Mikhail S.Memoirs. New York: Double-
day, 1996. In this wide-ranging autobiography,
Gorbachev discusses his rise to power, meetings
with global leaders, and the fall of the Soviet
Union and communism.
Shultz, George P.Turmoil and Triumph: My Years as
Secretar y of State. New York: Charles Scribner’s
Sons, 1993. As secretary of state under Reagan,
Shultz played a significant role in the five summit
meetings held between Reagan and Gorbachev.The Eighties in America Reykjavik Summit 825