risk. There should be a structure in place to antici-
pate their needs and deal with frustrations before
they escalate. Because of their short duration, most
attacks were actually stopped by school personnel
before law enforcement was able to arrive. There-
fore, schools need to refine their own emergency
management procedures and anticipate future
threats. One example of this is reacting firmly and
swiftly to guns brought in, as well as reports of weap-
ons or bombs. These are frequent precursors of an
actual attack.
Impact Violence in schools during the 1990’s dra-
matically highlighted the necessity for law-enforce-
ment and educational personnel to redouble and
coordinate their efforts to restore a sense of order
and balance, ensuring a comfortable environment
for students. Although the most serious forms of vio-
lence have been infrequent, the fear generated pro-
pelled government at the highest levels to prioritize
its attempt to ensure safety. Lessons learned from ex-
periences with school violence in the 1990’s provide
a solid basis for future preventive planning, with the
recognition that it cannot be guaranteed that
schools can avoid all incidents.
Further Reading
Borum, Randy. “Assessing Violence Risk Among
Youth.”Journal of Clinical Psychology56 (2000):
1263-1288. Research addressing fundamental
school violence issues.
Klein, Jessie. “Sexuality and School Shootings: What
Role Does Teasing Play in School Massacres?”
Journal of Homosexuality51, no. 4 (2006): 39-62.
The “bullying” etiological theory.
Reddy, Marisa, et al. “Evaluating Risk for Targeted
Violence in Schools: Comparing Risk Assessment,
Threat Assessment, and Other Approaches.”Psy-
chology in the Schools38 (2001): 157-172. Contrasts
threat assessment with more traditional risk as-
sessment approach to predicting violent inci-
dents.
Thomerson, Julie.School Violence: Sharing Student In-
formation. Denver: National Conference of State
Legislatures, 2001. A valuable guide to the legal is-
sues involved in coordinating agency efforts to
counter school violence.
Eric W. Metchik
See also Antidepressants; Attention-deficit disor-
der; Columbine massacre; Crime; Drive-by shoot-
ings; Gun control; Hate crimes; Homeschooling;
Homosexuality and gay rights; Shepard, Matthew;
Video games; Year-round schools. Schwarzkopf, Norman
Identification American general who commanded
coalition forces during the 1991 Gulf War
Born August 22, 1934; Trenton, New Jersey
A highly decorated combat officer in the Vietnam War,
Schwarzkopf opted to remain a soldier and to be a part of the
rejuvenation of the U.S. militar y in the post-Vietnam era.
Rising ultimately to the rank of general (four star), he was
head of U.S. Central Command (Middle East) when Iraq
under Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait. His battle plan
resulted in a stunning one-hundred-hour victor y for coali-
tion forces.
Norman Schwarzkopf spent his formative years in
the Middle East, matriculated at West Point, and was
commissioned as a second lieutenant in 1956.
Highly intelligent, Schwarzkopf served two years
with the 101st Airborne Division before returning to
West Point to teach. The escalation of American in-
volvement in Vietnam abbreviated that assignment,
and Captain Schwarzkopf was posted as an adviser to
a South Vietnamese Airborne Division in 1965. His
two tours of duty during the war transformed the
young officer into the passionate, yet compassion-
ate, commander who dominated the battlefield as
few others have in the modern era.
Standing an imposing six foot, three inches, and
possessing a fiery temper, Schwarzkopf was a sol-
dier’s soldier. He worked closely with his Vietnamese
counterparts and was known to defy orders that
might jeopardize his men. When his unit inadver-
tently entered an enemy minefield, Schwarzkopf
personally rescued a wounded soldier, for which he
was awarded a Silver Star. More important, he won
the respect of black soldiers who were astonished to
see a white colonel save a black soldier at a time
when the Army was experiencing racial turmoil.
Vietnam made him more reflective of the human
costs of war; body counts and captured weapons
were not measures of success, the lives of his troops
were. His personal philosophy mirrored what later
would become known as the Weinberger Doctrine:752 Schwarzkopf, Norman The Nineties in America