Conclusion 271
the Marxists and some neo-evolutionists and that studies the nomadic soci-
ety’s development from stock-breeding towards agriculture, is inapplicable in
the case of the steppe statehood. The same applies for the so-called stagna-
tion or immobility of the steppe nomads, prompting A. Toynbee to define a
separate nomadic civilization and to include it among the so-called stillborn
civilizations.9 A far more appropriate approach would be a multi-linear one,
i.e. the idea that evolution (seen as a process that is not necessarily progres-
sive) can take on multiple directions that do not arise from the same causes
and do not lead to the same results.10 With regard to the nomads, the vari-
ous possibilities and courses for development are perhaps best presented by
A. Khazanov.11
As was mentioned previously, most studies of the steppe empires are based
on the theory of a cultural, economic and ideological divide between the
nomadic world and the agricultural one.12 The nomadic community is almost
always presented as separate (ethnically or culturally) from the sedentary
ones. It is assumed that the idea of establishing a state was not inherent to the
nomads and so it did not emerge, in light of their inner development. Since
the nomadic pastoralist economy did not provide enough food for the popula-
tion, it needed the produce of the farmers. This produce was obtained through
plunder or a compulsory tribute, which prompted the nomads to enter into
stronger alliances.
According to Th. Barfield’s theory, the strength of the steppe empire was
proportional to the power of the neighboring sedentary state (which in this
case was China). When China became weak, the nomads did not create strong
unions. And vise versa, a strong China caused the emergence of the Hunnu
state.13 As N. Kradin notes, the opposite is also possible (a strong steppe state
next to a weak China), although he sides in general with the theory of Th.
Barfield.14
Th. Barfield believes that steppe states resembled empires, which he calls
“shadow empires” or “mirror empires”, since they were imperial in appearance,
but did not undergo significant changes in their inner structures in the direc-
tion of the empire model before them (China). They were secondary empires,
9 Toynbee 2001.
10 See the generalizing article of Claessen 2000.
11 Khazanov, 1994.
12 Khazanov 1975, 1994, and 2001; Pletneva 1982; Kradin 2001a and 2001b; Kradin and
Skrynnikova 2006; Barfield 2001a and 2001b.
13 Barfield 2001a and 2001b.
14 Kradin and Skrynnikova 2006, 122–123.