238 chapter four
the intensity of the conflict peaked toward the end of the period when,
after two years of relative calm (1384–1385) it became what Genoese
sources at least called “a war with the Solkhat and the emperor.”373 cem-
balo and Soldaia were fortified, their garrisons strengthened and a brigan-
tine armed to watch the Kerch straits.374 In May 1386, the colonists scored
a few successes against the tartars of Solkhat.375
Such small victories were mere episodes. By the time hostilities ended
in august 1387, the caffans were not even able to quash a revolt by the
inhabitants of Gothia at the edge of their lands.376 the government of
caffa tried to drag Moldavia into the fight with the tartars in spring 1387377
but this did not break the stalemate378 and they were forced to sue for
peace. Several embassies were sent to Qutlugh Bugha, who was still lord
of Solkhat and governor of crimea, and to khan toqtamïsh at Sarai, with
the obligatory presents,379 but these were not enough to soften the tartar
stance and the war still raged at the beginning of summer 1387.380 there
was no prospect of an end to a war bogged down in pointless military
and diplomatic action, when—suddenly and unexpectedly—a new treaty
of friendship was signed on 12th august by Qutlugh Bugha in the name
of the khan and Gentile dei Grimaldi and Gianone del Bosco for Genoa.381
373 Musso, “Note,” p. 79: la guerra con Sorcati e con l’imperatore.
374 the ship was outfitted in 1386 occasione guerre ad Vospolum pro Matrega (Balard,
Romanie, I, pp. 157, 159).
375 expenses are noted on 4th May for several botte di vino [.. .] pro victoria habita and
goods plundered from the tartars were sold at auction (Musso, “Note,” p. 79).
376 Balard, I, Romanie, p. 161, considers that heavy taxation by the Genoese was the
principal cause of the revolt. Most of the rebellious locals were Goths, ceded by the horde
to the republic by the treaties of 1380–1382; the caffan soldiers sent pro damnificando
inimicos were unable to bring the Goths to heel.
377 preparations were already being made to send envoys to akkerman on 2nd May
1386, but it was only on 24th august that expenses were noted for the boat qui portavit
Carollum de Orto et Illarium de Duria Maocastro, ambaxiatores euntes Constantino et Petro
veyvoda occasione guerre de Sorcati (papacostea, “Începuturile,” p. 45; pp. 43–49 for the
identity of Constantinus with costea Voyevoda, his part in unifying Moldavian territory,
and ending tartar rule in the region).
378 Moldavia’s anti-tartar stance, proven by the fact that Vasiliy Dmitriyevich, son of
Dmitriy Donskoy, fled there in 1386 when he escaped from Mongol captivity, might be good
reason to assume that the caffan envoys found a willing audience; if Moldavia intervened
in the conflict at all, however, this was not enough to change the course of the war.
379 Musso, “Note,” pp. 80–81.
380 on 18th June the doge of Genoa advised his counterpart in Venice to forbid Vene-
tian citizens from visiting the war-torn Northern Black Sea, since they might be affected
by tartar raids; for the course of the war, Murzakevič, Istoriya.
381 text in Sacy, “pièces,” pp. 62–64.