82 chapter three
this restoration of the status ante quo in 1288–1289 seemed unassail-
able, since it was backed up by the overwhelming superiority of the geno-
ese fleet against mamluk naval power.98 however, cairo did not accept
the suggested compromise solution that the freedom of the port of ayas
in cilician armenia should be exchanged for the freedom of alexandria:
tripoli, the pivot of the whole operation, was stormed at the beginning of
march 1289, and surrendered at the end of the following month.99 geno-
ese merchants found in syrian or egyptian ports were arrested.100
even though the admiral persisted in his campaign and captured a mus-
lim ship even after the surrender,101 to show the sultan that even with-
out tripoli he could still block the sea routes to alexandria, the genoese
leadership considered that the loss of this last bridgehead in the eastern
mediterranean was the final act in the confrontation with egypt.
relations with the mamluk sultan were then normalized under unusu-
ally severe terms, which the genoese accepted for a variety of reasons,
foremost of which was the prospect of losing to the venetians their posi-
tion as intermediaries to the golden horde.102 the head of the mamluk
chancery plausibly records that his sovereign was not easily persuaded
by the genoese diplomats, led by alberto spinola.103 the sultan hesitated
over concluding the peace not from chagrin at what had happened, but
because he was unsettled by the appearance of a new threat.
after Benedetto Zaccaria had finished his mission, the official attitude
in genoa was shaped by those who favored a peace with the mamluks.
nevertheless, advocates of a continued war not only existed but even took
action. going by analogy with other episodes, it is highly likely that this
was a private initiative which formally went against government policy
but which nevertheless had its tacit approval.104
98 for the miserable condition of the mamluk fleet, see ayalon, “mamluks,” and idem,
“Wafidiya.”
99 cf. caro, Genua, ii, pp. 129–130, lopez, Genova, pp. 148–149.
100 doria/imperiale di sant’angelo, p. 324, holt, “treaty,” p. 101.
101 cf. the fairly convergent accounts of the event from the opposing camps; doria/
imperiale di sant’angelo, p. 324, and ibn ‛abd al-Ẓāhir (holt, “treaty,” p. 101); see also com-
mentaries in caro, Genua, ii, pp. 130–133, lopez, Genova, pp. 151–154, ciocîltan, “genoa,”
p. 296.
102 cf. ciocîltan, “genoa,” pp. 296–297.
103 ibn ‛abd al-Ẓāhir in holt, “treaty,” p. 101.
104 cf. the case of segurano salvaigo in chapter 4.2.4 below. there is no doubt that in
the ultra-liberal genoese state, individuals could act on their own accord in ways which
could endanger the interests of all; among the aims of the office of the gazaria, founded in
1313, was the regulation of such anarchic developments which might harm the commune
at large (cf. the comparison with venetian centralisation in lopez, “venise”).