86 chapter three
in a desperate state.115 the government of genoa likewise unflinchingly
cut away the cypriot arm of admiral Zaccaria’s military-political alliance
when they refused to ratify the treaty made with henry ii.116 Unsurpris-
ingly, the king never forgave this treachery.117
this harsh policy also obliged genoa to make a third sacrifice in the
spring of 1290, when they abandoned the Baghdad-aden project.118 despite
growing resistance,119 this was the actual outcome of the attempt to block
the flow of trade in the indian ocean and the red sea: utter failure, just as
in the mediterranean. defiance toward egypt dwindled away.
the treaty of may 1290 was the real outcome of the confrontation
between genoa and the mamluks. firstly, it explicitly acknowledged the
egyptian victory by sea and on land, and secondly, it implicitly, though no
less definitively, recognized that the ligurian republic had been defeated.
genoa, which had reacted so decisively to the danger that the silk road
may be cut off,120 resigned itself to the knowledge that it had risked its
entire levantine trade for a goal which it had failed to reach.
115 see the letter of 15th June 1291 to King edward i of england (cotton/luard, pp. 219–
223).
116 the treaty was formally repudiated in may 1292 (doria/imperiale di sant’angelo,
p. 322, caro, Genua, ii, pp. 127, 131, pistarino, “genova,” p. 114).
117 doria/imperiale di sant’angelo, p. 322: Ex hoc dictus rex postea Januenses male tenuit
et minus honoravit.
118 there is no documentary proof of official involvement in or indeed disengagement
from the enterprise on the tigris; yet even had the sultan known nothing of it at the time
he signed the treaty, the first attempt by genoese galleys to sail freely in the indian ocean
would have wrecked the agreement and mamluk ports would once again have closed to
merchants from the republic. proof that genoa respected the treaty is, rather, e silentio;
although the republic’s ships sailed in these waters, no source records that there were
engaged in armed action.
119 guillaume adam attributes the quarrels which ended work in the Baghdad ship-
yards to the italian love of faction (see above, p. 83 note 105). Yet to break out with such
force when the shipbuilders had been working together in peace all winter, some new
element had to have intruded which led to the violence. the factor provoking the explo-
sion can only have been the order to cease construction, which was in full swing and at a
promising stage. Understandably, the order caused shock and rage among those entrusted
with the project, while the perspective from which raison d’état could be judged differed
drastically from iraq to genoa. given the great interests committed to the plan’s success,
the order from home could not but provoke disagreement and resistance. thus the strong
dissension which marked the ligurian republic in this year was much sharper in Baghdad
than in the home city, and the policy dominating the home front was only able to win
through on the tigris after genoese blood had been shed.
120 it was probable that the regime governing foreigners in mamluk territory would
be extended to cilician armenia: Soldanus vero per terras quas tenet non permitti aliquem
Christianum transire, qui in Indiam cupiat transfretare (sanudo/Bongars, p. 23).