The Pursuit of Power. Technology, Armed Force, and Society since A.D. 1000

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166 Chapter Five

sporadic sharpshooting before regular battle had been joined. Other
armies soon began to create “light infantry” of their own to perform
similar roles. French tactical improvements between 1763 and 1791
therefore drew freely on the experience of other European armies.^26
Sometimes French innovations failed and were swiftly abandoned.
This was the fate of an experiment with breech-loading muskets made
in 1768.^27 After designers gave up this radical idea, a slightly modified
muzzle-loader was declared standard in 1777 and remained unaltered
until 1816. An old-fashioned design did not prevent upgrading of
manufacture, however. Official inspectors began to insist on greater
standardization of parts, with the result, presumably, that French
muskets became more durable and accurate.^28
Far more spectacular and important changes proved feasible in ar­
tillery design. Classification of cannon according to the weight of shot
they could fire had been systematized in the age of Charles V in all
European countries. Early in the eighteenth century, Jean-Florent de
Vallière (1667–1759) reduced the number of different calibers in use
in the French service. But this sort of standardization remained only
approximate as long as each gun had to be cast in a unique and indi­
vidual mold. It was well-nigh impossible to align the core of the mold
accurately with the exterior, since at the time of casting the rush of hot
metal almost always pushed the imperfectly centered and weakly sup­
ported core slightly out of position. Consequently, the chamber and
barrel of the gun, which took its shape from the mold’s core, usually
were not perfectly parallel to the exterior of the piece; and lesser
irregularities in interior dimensions were taken for granted. Cannon,
as cast, were too heavy to keep up with marching troops and so seldom


  1. On the tactical debate, cf. Colin, L'infanterie au XVIIIe siècle; Mention, Le comte de
    Saint-Germain, pp. 187–210; Quimby, The Background of Napoleonic Warfare; Robert R.
    Palmer, “Frederick the Great, Guibert, Bülow: From Dynastic to National War,’’ in
    Edward M. Earle, ed., Makers of Modern Strategy (Princeton, 1943), pp. 49–74; Henry
    Spenser Wilkinson, The French Army before Napoleon (Oxford, 1915). For tactics and
    enclosure see Richard Glover, Peninsular Preparation: The Reform of the British Army,
    1795–1804 (Cambridge, 1963), p. 124. For skirmishing and light infantry see Gunther
    Rothenberg, The Military Border in Croatia, 1 740–1881 : A Study of an Imperial Institu­
    tion (Chicago, 1966), pp. 18–39 and passim; Peter Paret, Yorck and the Era of Prussian
    Reform, 1807–1815 (Princeton, 1966), pp. 24–42.

  2. Several thousand breech-loading muskets were manufactured, but when the
    breech mechanism proved faulty, the inventor committed suicide, according to Ken-
    nett, The French Armies in the Seven Years War, pp. 116, 140.

  3. After 1794, when the French annexed Liège, gunmakers of that city, the most
    practiced of all Europe, were compelled to upgrade their performance by the new
    French inspectors. For details see Gaier, Four Centuries of Liège Gunmaking, pp. 95 ff.

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