World Wars of the Twentieth Century 319
ing, since the able-bodied workers had been drafted like everybody
else.^26 Hence when it became clear that the artillery was going to be
continually engaged in firing shells across the trench lines in hitherto
unimagined numbers,^27 the French minister of war concluded, as early
as 20 September 1914, that he would have to release men from the
army to manufacture the needed ammunition. At first, confusion pre
vailed. Employers were authorized to comb railway stations and other
likely places in search of suitably skilled men.^28
From the first, the French authorities saw that improvisation was
necessary because so much of the nation’s prewar metallurgical plant
had fallen into enemy hands. All sorts of firms were therefore called
upon to manufacture war materiel by setting up new assembly lines,
converting machinery to new uses, and inventing production methods
in the light of local conditions and possibilities. Memories of 1793 and
the Parisian workshops of that year made massive improvisation
easier. So did the readiness of politicians to hand over details to local
committees of industrialists, who portioned out contracts and tasks
among themselves and coordinated their efforts with the army’s over
all requirements through frequent conferences with an appropriate
cabinet minister.^29
- Prewar plans called for production of 10,000–12,000 75mm shells per day in time
of war. A work force of 7,600 was therefore kept back at the time of mobilization while
the balance of arsenal workers, who totaled 45,000–50,000, were drafted. At Le Creusot,
6,600 out of a work force of 13,000 remained after mobilization in 1914. These figures
come from Gerd Hardach, “La mobilization industrielle en 1914–1918: Production,
planification et idéologie,” in Patrick Fridenson, éd., 1914—1918: Vautre front (Paris,
19?7), p. 83.
- In all previous wars, field artillery spent nearly all the time trying to get into firing
position. Active bombardment of the foe usually lasted only a few hours so that con
sumption of ammunition had remained correspondingly modest. The trench warfare of
1914–18 reversed matters, for the guns were perpetually in position to fire, and worth
while enemy targets were always within range. The supply of shells (and of small arms
ammunition) therefore became the effective limit on operations as never before. Logis
tics and, ultimately, industrial capacity to manufacture guns and ammunition became
decisive. All the combatants came to recognize this quite unanticipated industrialization
of war by the spring of 1915.
- Not until August 1915 did a public law regulate the status of workers released
from the army to work in war production. They remained under military command, but
were paid civilian wages, wore a distinctive badge, and could be assigned where most
needed without the right to refuse any proffered form of work. Return to the front was
the alternative such men faced for any act of indiscipline. See Gilbert Hatry, Renault:
Usine de guerre, 1914–1918 (n.p., n.d.), pp. 79, 92–93.
- The first such conference took place on 20 September 1914 when a goal of
100,000 75mm shells per day was promulgated by the minister of war. Weekly meetings
thereafter changed first to biweekly and then to monthly meetings; and a new Ministry
of Munitions took over political responsibility after May 1915. Three perspicacious
