World Wars of the Twentieth Century 355
Great Britain. A plan for all-out mobilization of America’s resources
achieved definition only a few days before the attack on Pearl Harbor
made it politically feasible to implement the Victory Program, as it
was called for propaganda purposes. It took two more years before
administrative means were fully developed to manage American re
sources according to plans based on the requirements of future mi
litary operations. Along the way, innumerable discrepancies arose
between demand and supply, plan and fulfillment. Quarrels over allo
cation of scarce materials and other factors of production were often
very bitter. Nevertheless, the end result was a spectacular increase in
American output of war materiel, and of an enormous number of
other goods needed to supplement British, Russian, and other Allied
war economies as well. The kind of scheduling required to keep a
complicated assembly line running smoothly in a great factory was, in
effect, applied to the entire national economy of the United States.
Increases in productivity and in absolute quantities of physical goods
turned out to order were analogous to the increases mass production
methods had already made possible when applied within a single
firm.^87
Interlocking with Great Britain became very intimate indeed.
British and French experts had a hand in suggesting to Americans how
to organize their war effort;^88 and negotiations over allocation of Lend
Lease supplies involved continual exchange of information about eco
nomic as well as military plans. Britain needed food and raw materials
from the United States; in return Britain provided various services
to American forces stationed in the British Isles, and lands under
British imperial control supplied certain raw materials needed by the
United States. But as the war years went on, Great Britain put an
increasing proportion of its resources into the armed services and
military production and, like Russia, had to rely on imports from the
United States to fill widening gaps in home production.
A more or less rational and deliberate division of labor in economic
- Official figures may be found in U.S., Civilian Production Administration, Indus
trial Mobilization for War: History of the War Production Board and Predecessor Agencies,
1940–1945 (Washington, D.C., 1947). Donald M. Nelson, Arsenal of Democracy (New
York, 1946) is a personal account by the principal administrator of the War Production
Board.
- Jean Monnet, whose public career had started as French representative on the
Allied Maritime Transport Council in 1917, was a leading figure in persuading Ameri
cans to draw up the Victory Program in 1941. Cf. his Mémoires, pp. 179–212. John
Maynard Keynes also played an important role in transmitting macroeconomic concepts
and expertise to Americans. Cf. Roy F. Harrod, The Life of John Maynard Keynes (Lon
don, 1951), pp. 505–14, 525–623.
