The Noble Servitor and the Petrine State^119
officers in the tsar's service. These contacts were often antagonistic, but they
did something to enlarge the provincial gentryman's mental horizons. Intellec-
tually-and perhaps even morally, due to changing concepts of honour-the
Russian shlyakhtich of the 1720s was likely to be a different kind of person
from his grandfather who had fought in the gentry levy during the
seventeenth-century Cossack wars.
The military talents of this militia were portrayed in most uncomplimentary
terms by the publicist Pososhkov, an artisan's son. Some privileged servitors,
he averred, could not even load their muskets, let alone shoot straight; they
were less concerned with killing the enemy than with returning home safely
and would take to the woods en masse when the Tatars approached.^3 This
statement has often been quoted uncritically: Pososhkov advocated a small
highly-trained cadre army, an idea which the tsar rejected in favour of massive
forces; but his criticism did contain an element of truth. The militia clearly
needed reform if it was to maintain its historical role of helping to protect the
steppe frontier; and it was totally unsuited to combat the well-trained armies
of Charles XII.
As we have seen in ch. 5, a number of privileged servitors were called up in
1700-1 to form regiments of dragoons; about 13,000 to 14,000 of them were
probably under arms at that time.^4 Those rejected on physical grounds were
enlisted later-and not necessarily in the cavalry. In the first years of the war
the government raised recruits wherever it could find them, with little concern
for social distinctions.^5 Those who were of gentry background, provided they
displayed a minimum of competence, could expect to become NCOs and
officers fairly rapidly; but this was as much a consequence of the high casualty
.r:ate as it was of any t~nderness for their class origin or personal preferences.
Correspondingly, men from non-privileged circumstances could rise up
through the ranks, and commissions were sometimes granted on the battlefield
to men who showed exceptional merit. This was a time when the army did
indeed act as a conduit for the upwardly mobile. But neither Peter nor the
members of his entourage made this a policy objective. Their concern was solely
with military efficiency. The tsar always insisted that promotion take place in
an orderly manner, according to merit: this had been the immediate pretext for
his quarrel with Shein in 1698 (seep. 100). The concept of 'merit' was vague,
and might mean no more than trouble-free service in a subordinate rank; but
primarily it meant technical proficiency. An early disciplinary code laid down
that all officers and NCOs were to be tested individually as to their skill in per-
forming complicated manoeuvres; 'if someone senior is clumsy and a sub-
ordinate does it better, he shall be demoted and the junior man promoted in his
J '0 ratnom povedenii' (1701), in Pososhkov, Kniga, p. 268.
4 Rabinovich, 'Formirovaniyc', p. 234.
5 For c"ample, PSZ iv. 1978 (8 Apr. 1704), 2090 (I Feb. 1706), 2111-12 (11-13 June 1706),
2197, 2199 (23 Apr., 13 May 1708).