The Noble Servitor and the Petrine State 125a number of years in a particular grade. The latter had the implication of qual-
ity rather than quantity of service, that is, of special individual merit, such as
valorous exploits in battle. But, to complicate matters further, such merit
might be potential rather than actual. The sovereign, as an absolute ruler,
could of couise appoint anyone to any offi~c, ~uuft:rring upon him the
appropriate chin and accelerating his promotion up the hierarchy. So too
could those senior individuals to whom such power was delegated by the
monarch. There was nothing very surprising about this: a general had to be
able to fill a vacancy quickly, which meant rewarding a subordinate who
displayed uncommon talent, whether actual or potential. But this loophole
opened the way to arbitrary decisions, and thus the apparently rigid ranking
system, like its Muscovite predecessor, was really quite flexible. Vysluga could
indeed be ascertained objectively, by calculating the number of years spent
blamelessly in the service; but zasluga implied a subjective judgement. Not
only was the assessment of merit likely to be partisan; it might also be affected
by kinship ties or other links between appointee and appointer. The latter bore
full responsibility for his assessment. To be sure, he was supposed to comply
with bureaucratic procedures and would normally consult candidates' records
(including their personal attestaty or kharakteristiki-certificates of good
conduct signed by superiors and fellow-servitors); but in the eighteenth-
century context he was likely to consider their genealogical seniority as well.
Place-seeking had been abolished in 1682; aristocracy had not. Peter was
suspicious of the old Muscovite boyarstvo, but harboured no prejudice against
persons of ancient lineage; he was concerned only that they should serve him
loyally. Although some of his most celebrated associates, such as Menshikov,
were of humble birth, and others were foreigners, the great majority came
from the higher reaches of the Russian nobility. So far as army officers are
concerned, this fact has been established by recent research. Rabinovich's
study of a sample of 2,245 officers (about 53 per cent of the total) in 1720-1
shows that 61.9 per cent were noblemen (dvoryane) by birth and only 13.9 per
cent from a non-privileged background (former peasants, townsmen, or
clergy).^37 Of the former group, 22.6 per cent were from the old metropolitan
nobility.^38 These men were concentrated in the upper ranks of the officer
corps. The new entrants to the dvoryanstvo who had risen up from the ranks,
316 in number in this sample, were overwhelmingly subalterns or else belonged
to the so-called 'junior staff' (quartermasters, surgeons, clerks, etc.); only 20
of them had reached the rank of captain and a single one that of lieutenant-
colonel. Western research into the genera/itet (holders of the first four military
ranks)^39 confirms that the intake of' fresh blood' into the nobility was relatively
37 Rabinovich, 'Sots. proiskhozhdeniye', pp. 138-9. Another 10.6 per cent were former
strertsy or other lower-grade (po priboru) servitors; 12.6 per cent were foreigners and 1 per cent of
undetermined origin.
38 Ibid., p. 141, ~here the misleading term 'feudal aristocracy' is used.
39 Meehan-Waters, 'Muse. Noble Origins', pp. 31, 40; id., Autocracy, pp. 29-37.