30 The Warrior Tsar, 1689-1725im.^49 At the district level the voivode was replaced by a commandant (komen-
ant), but this was little more than a change of name;^50 the only difference was
1at, in Claes Peterson's words, 'his administration was supervised with the
elp of military units'-especially those drawn from Lhe guard::..
The provinces had scarcely been established when, in January 1710, Peter
~raciously decided to impose state expenditure, for the army, the Admiralty
nd other disbursements, upon the provinces, so that everyone should know
rhence he could get a specific amount [of funds]'.^51 This measure gave generals
nd central officials carte blanche to demar.d from the governors an unlimited
upply of resources. The tsar laid down thal the needs of the armed forces were
:> be satisfied first. Some provinces were aiready spending all their revenue on
:iilitary purposes and had nothing left for their own requirements. In an effort
o equalize the burden a census was undertaken, but it encountered widespread
abotage. Some householders took to the woods, while others,bribed officials
o overlook their existence. The figures reported were so inaccurate that the
;overnment disregarded them and went back to those of the long outdated
ensus of 1678. It was on this basis that the-population had to pay for the
Lrmy: its costs were fixed in the first establishment table ( 1711) and distributed
tmong the provinces in such a way that each regiment was to be maintained
'rom the revenue collected in a particular fraction (do/ya) of a province. The
'raction was at first conceived as an arithmetical abstraction rather than as an
tctual territorial unit; it was to consist of 5,536 households, so that tffere were
1461/z do/i in the country as a whole.^52 On paper at least this was a rough and
·eady method of sharing out the burden. The central authorities did not try to
!stablish a uniform assessment per household, but left this to be arrived at
.ocally; each community could act as it pleased in distributing its portion of the
!Oad, which was to be paid partly in cash and partly in kind, as the military
authorities required.
The reform clearly left a great deal to chance; but its principal defect lay
elsewhere. Army units were likely to be stationed outside their assigned pro-
vince, 53 which meant that it would be difficult to convey to them whatever
had been collected for their sustenance. The job of liaison was entrusted to
so-called commissars (komissary)-military officials who occupied an ill-
defined position between the central War Commissariat, the local governor,
and the regimental authorities. The commissars, hard pressed and untrained
for their delicate task, could not ensure a steady flow of money and supplies.
This explains why in 1715 other officials called rural counsellors (landraty)
were introduced at the level of the fraction, which now assumed the lineaments
(^49) Milyukov, Gos. khoz. Rossii, p. 294, n. 4; Peterson, Reforms (see fn. 48) pp. 238-9;
Danilov, in SVM i. 59.
50 Bogoslovsky, Obi. reforma, p. 47, disagrees.
51 [Peter I] Zhurnal, p. 253; cf. PSZ iv. 2247 (27) (27 Jan. 1710).
52 Klyuchevsky, Soch., iv. 159 (Peter the Great, pp. 196-7).
53 For an example see DiP iv (i). 44 (13 Jan. 1714).